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ABSTRACT
Co-management has been recognized as an important scheme in successfully
governing common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2002). Contrary to Hardin’s
Tragedy of the Commons (1968) or Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965),
empirical research has found many long-lasting self-governing communities through
extensive case studies (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1989). This is
no exception in fishery (Pinkerton, 1994). Fishery cooperatives, where fishermen
collectively manage the fishery, have been garnering much attention from both
regulators and academics (Costello, 2012; Deacon, 2012; Townsend, Shotton, &
Uchida, 2008). In fact, Northeast multispecies groundfish fishery in US has
implemented a sector management system, in which voluntarily formed sub-groups of
harvesters may manage their collective total share of the harvest as a group right
(Pinto da Silva & Kitts, 2006). Thus, understanding how and why fishery comanagement succeeds is not only important but also timely in terms of policy
relevance.
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to investigate how co-management in
a fishery can contribute to better societal outcomes. To meet this goal, I construct the
following two objectives and the hypotheses associated with each objective. The first
objective corresponds to manuscript 1, and the second objective spans over
manuscripts 2 and 3.
The first objective is to examine how common property management systems
may emerge endogenously. In particular, recent trends in fisheries management are to
further devolve responsibility to users by partitioning allowable extraction and

assigning them to groups of users. Each group may manage their collective share of
the harvest of each species as a group right, which results in a fishery with a single set
of total allowable catch concurrently managed by multiple management groups. I
designed a laboratory experiment based on the Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot
Program, which features a sector managed by individual quota and a common pool
derby for harvesters who do not join the sector. I allowed harvesters to choose whether
to join the individual quota sector prior to each season based on the outcomes they
experience under each system. The main hypothesis is that subjects move toward the
individual quota system, which supports the efficient harvesting strategy as
equilibrium, rather than adopt cooperative strategies in a less restrictive common pool
institution, or stay in an inefficiently operating common pool. I then associate
individual variation in the rate of moving to the individual quota system with otherregarding preferences, risk preferences, and a taste for competition.
Through successive fishing seasons, the frequency of subjects' choosing the
individual quota sector rises from half to over 80 percent of subjects. This suggests
that the efficiencies associated with strong individual fishing rights may emerge
endogenously from the sectorization process, even without imposing them through
regulation. The results also find enjoyment of competition becomes significant at later
seasons, but other-regarding preferences and risk preferences are not a significant
driver in the long run.
The second objective is to explain why and how revenue sharing arrangement in a
co-managed fishery can achieve successful management and to provide insights into
revenue sharing arrangement as an alternative management tool. Under revenue

sharing arrangement a group of harvesters shares catch and/or revenue among
members of a fishery cooperative equally, or according to an agreed rule, regardless of
individual effort or performance. Social capital potentially affects the efficiency that
revenue sharing brings while revenue sharing can foster social capital, which could
eventually lead to better management outcomes. I hypothesize the synergy between
the two factors, i.e., revenue sharing arrangement and social capital. An important
intermediary between the two factors and the outcomes is collective efforts performed
as a group often in a community-managed fishery. The following four hypotheses will
be tested under this objective. First, the fishery groups under revenue sharing
arrangement achieve better outcomes in a fishery, compared with similar groups
without such arrangement. Second, the fishery groups with greater social capital
achieve better outcomes in a fishery. Third, the interaction between revenue sharing
arrangement and social capital further enhances success in a fishery. Lastly, the groups
under revenue sharing arrangement foster greater social capital.
I quantified social capital using controlled economic experiments with fisherman
subjects as well as surveys. Using the data collected from ten fishery groups engaging
in a small-scale trawl fishery in northern Japan and wild cluster bootstrap for small
sample inference, I find the indirect effect of revenue sharing augmenting information
network, which then improves an economic outcome in a fishery. Revenue sharing
arrangement provides disincentives to compete and accompanies synchronized
collective fishing operation, which encourages fishers to exchange sensitive fishing
information that would not have been shared otherwise. This greater information
network then has a positive impact on economic performance because it enables

fishery groups to effectively coordinate in fishing efforts and other collective efforts.
However, the direct effect of revenue sharing improving an outcome does not seem to
be robust. In addition, I find evidence of various aspects of social capital improving
both outcomes in a fishery. While trust increases the ex-vessel prices, the groups with
fishers having similar information network size achieve better stock conditions over
time. Interestingly, revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate
unconditionally (i.e., unilaterally) and furthermore they are less likely to cooperate
conditionally (i.e., only if others cooperate).
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PREFACE
Manuscript Format is in use for this dissertation. The dissertation consists of three
manuscripts along with overarching introduction and conclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
Direct regulation, or so-called command-and-control, has been a standard
management tool for regulators in balancing the conservation of coastal resources and
achieving economic efficiency of resource use. However, direct regulations are often
ineffective in achieving these goals. This is in part due to the fact that for regulations
to meet both environmental and economic goals in fishery they need to have an
extensive knowledge on the resources and fishers’ harvesting activities. It is apparent
that this is often not the case.
First suggested by Christy (1973), an individual quota or a catch shares system
has been recognized as an effective alternative to direct regulations for better fishery
management (Arnason, 1990), but not without limitations. While often dubbed as
decentralized or privatized system so as to suggest that it needs minimal involvement
of governments, the catch share system requires governments with strong enforcement
powers and well-established market institutions. For example, without an effective
monitoring and enforcement of allocated share (i.e., making sure that no one exceeds
the share) the catch share system will be undermined and could eventually collapse
(Copes, 1986). If a share is transferable, market institutions are necessary to ensure
transactions and to set the market price that reflects the shadow value of the fishery.
Co-management has been gaining attention in fishery management in the US. For
example, the Northeast multispecies groundfish fishery implemented a sector
management system (Amendment 16), in which voluntarily formed sub-groups of
harvesters may manage their collective total share of the harvest of each species as a
group right. Fishery cooperatives, where fishermen collectively manage the fishery,
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have been garnering much attention as a way to complement and/or supplement
existing management systems such as rights-based management from both regulators
and academics (Deacon, 2012; Townsend, Shotton, & Uchida, 2008). Thus,
understanding how and why the fishery co-management succeeds is not only
important but also timely in terms of policy relevance.
Co-management is a broad concept that its precise definition can hardly be
complete. It can be agreed, however, that co-management represents a “collaborative
and participatory process” of decision-making as regards to management of one or
more natural resources among or between multiple stakeholders such as user-groups
and government agencies (Wilson, Nielsen, & Degnbol, 2003, p. 3). In this
dissertation the essential aspect of co-management is that resource users possess
independent regulatory power to set and enforce their own rules of management under
the authorities. Thus, it is not exclusive to non rights-based management or other types
of rights-based management. In the case of fisheries management co-managed
fisheries can self-implement the individual quota system, transferable or not, in
addition to other operational and management rules.
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to investigate how co-management in
a fishery can contribute to better societal outcomes. To meet this goal, I construct the
two objectives and the hypotheses associated with each objective (Figure A).
While regulators rarely implement a new system to manage natural resources
without facing any opposition, resource users’ voluntary transition to an efficient
management system, if possible, can ease such political hindrance. All regulators need
to do is to let a community decide what is best for them. In fact, sector management in
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Multispecies Groundfish Fishery in Northeast US has allowed harvesters to essentially
decide how to manage an allocated share of the catch. As a result, the fishery has been
experiencing the transition to a catch shares system since 2010 although some doubts
on to what degree a decision was voluntary during later years have been expressed
(Olson and Pinto da Silva, 2014). Furthermore, voluntary transition to a more efficient
management of the resources can eventually bring harvesters’ awareness of comanagement because the transition may signal the importance of engaging in
management decisions as a community.
The first objective in this dissertation, addressed in the first manuscript, is to
examine how common property management systems can evolve endogenously. In
particular, recent trends in fisheries management are to further devolve responsibility
to users by partitioning allowable extraction and assigning them to groups of users.
Each group may manage their collective share of the harvest of each species as a
group right, which results in a fishery with a single set of Total Allowable Catch
(TAC) concurrently managed by multiple management groups. I designed a controlled
economic experiment based on the Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot Program
(Anderson & Uchida, 2014; Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector, 2010; Pinto da
Silva & Kitts, 2006; Verani, 2006), featuring a sector managed by individual quota
and a common pool derby for harvesters who do not join the sector. I allowed
harvesters to choose whether to join the individual quota sector before each season
based on the outcomes they experience under each system. The main hypothesis is that
subjects move toward the individual quota system, which supports the efficient
harvesting strategy as equilibrium, rather than adopt cooperative strategies in a less
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restrictive common pool institution, or stay in an inefficiently operating common pool
(H1). I then associate individual variation in the rate of moving to the individual quota
system with social preferences, risk preferences, and a taste for competition.
Revenue sharing arrangement is a type of co-management practice, in which
harvesters share catch and/or profits among the members of a fishery cooperative.
Employment of such arrangement is a collective action that a group of harvesters
takes. The role of revenue sharing arrangement in fishery co-management has been
studied in the literature (Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba,
2008), but less studied are the quantitative effect of revenue sharing on management
outcomes (H2a) and its mechanism, through which revenue sharing arrangement
attains success. In manuscripts 2 and 3 I hypothesize that the interaction between
revenue sharing and social capital exists; revenue sharing affects social capital in a
community and among fishers, and social capital also influences various incentives
possibly induced under revenue sharing and the efficiency that such arrangement
brings (H2c).
Social capital is a concept that the attributes such as trust, cooperation, and
reciprocity among people and norms and networks in a community are important in
improving economic life (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2001). In particular, the role of
social capital in a community that self-governs a community resource has been
highlighted (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, &
Defeo, 2011; Pretty, 2003). In fact, Carpenter and Seki (2011) showed a strong
correlation between fishermen’s propensity to cooperate and fishing productivity.
Social capital is also found to be empirically associated with economic productivity in
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other workplace (Barr & Serneels, 2009; Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carter &
Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 2005; Knack & Keefer, 1997).
The objective consisting of the manuscripts 2 and 3 is to explain why and how
revenue sharing arrangement can achieve successful management of a fishery. The
manuscript 2 provides the first rigorous analysis on measuring the direct effects of
revenue sharing (H2a) and social capital (H2b) in a community-managed fishery, and
to identify the indirect effects resulting from the interaction between revenue sharing
and social capital (H2c). An important intermediary between the two factors, revenue
sharing arrangement and social capital, and the outcomes of a fishery is collective
efforts defined as any efforts performed as a group to increase harvesting performance
of a fishery. The efforts include stock enhancement, rotation of fishing grounds,
collective search for schools of fish, and collective use of fishing boats and/or fishing
gear. Revenue sharing arrangement and social capital enhance the effect of the
collective efforts, which leads to efficient and sustainable use of resources in the long
run. Contribution to the group efforts aligns with self-interest when a group of
harvesters shares revenue and harvesters are devoted to collective value due to social
capital in a community.
The manuscript 3 provides the quantitative effect of management systems—
whether the group has employed revenue sharing or not—on the social aspect of a
community (social capital). In particular, this manuscript asks whether a difference in
management systems can result in different cooperative relationships and different
information networks in a community (H3). This manuscript provides the first
rigorous analysis to measure the effect of different management systems on social
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capital and provides insights into an effective policy that can be employed for
development of social capital.
I empirically test the hypotheses in the manuscripts 2 and 3 using the data
collected in Japan, which is one of the countries that have a long history of comanagement in a fishery (Yamamoto, 1995) as well as ample cases of revenue
sharing. Many Japanese fisheries operating under revenue sharing have been
successfully managing the resources as well as generating resource rents (Carpenter &
Seki, 2011; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). I collected this unique
dataset containing group information from ten fishery groups engaging in small-scale
trawl fishery and individual information on 79 skippers belonging to the ten groups.
To quantify cooperation controlled economic experiments with fisherman subjects
were conducted. As for trust and information network indices are constructed from
survey responses of the same fisherman subjects. For the manuscript 2, I collected four
measurements of the outcomes in a fishery: ex-vessel price per kilogram (economic
outcome), resource stock density measured per squared meter (biological outcome),
and the other two from the survey (economic success perceived by fishers and
resource conditions perceived by fishers). Using wild cluster bootstrap for small
sample inference of the ten fishery groups, I rigorously quantify the effect of revenue
sharing and social capital. In addition, I explore the mechanism, through which those
factors interact with each other and affect the outcomes in a fishery.
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The Endogenous Evolution of Common Property Management Systems
Mihoko Tegawa
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
University of Rhode Island
Christopher M. Anderson
School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences
University of Washington
Abstract
While management of common pool resources has long recognized the value of
including resource users in the governance process, recent trends in fisheries
management are further devolving responsibility to users by partitioning allowable
extraction and assigning them to groups of users. Each group may manage their
collective share of the harvest of each species as a group right, which results in a
fishery with a single set of total allowable catch concurrently managed by multiple
management groups. This paper investigates how individual and aggregate outcomes
emerge as groups gain experience with use of their collective rights. We designed a
laboratory experiment, which features a sector managed by individual quota and a
common pool derby for harvesters who do not join the sector. We allowed harvesters
to choose whether to join the individual quota sector before each season based on the
outcomes they experience under each system. Through successive fishing seasons, the
frequency of subjects' choosing the individual quota sector rises from half to over 85
percent of subjects. This suggests that the efficiencies associated with strong
individual fishing rights may emerge endogenously from the sectorization process,
even without imposing them through regulation. Interestingly, a taste for competition
prohibits a complete transition into the individual quota sector.
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1.1 Introduction
While management of common pool resources has long recognized the value of
including resource users in the governance process (McCay & Acheson, 1987;
Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999), recent trends in fisheries management are further
devolving responsibility to users by partitioning allowable extraction and assigning
them to groups of users. These “use share” programs involve users not to determine a
single set of use rules, but rather encourage the formation of sectors—groups allocated
a collective share of total extraction that they may manage in any way they wish.
Different groups may manage their extraction in different ways while pursuing the
same resource, which integrates heterogeneity in management system preferences as
an intentional element of regulation. Sector management has emerged as progressive
user groups within large, heterogeneous fisheries; these fisheries has coalesced to
implement a particular management innovation, but without establishing the political
consensus for management change among all harvesters. This mitigates the task of
managers persuading all participants to use the same system, facilitating political
progress. However, it requires a framework for predicting outcomes when different
sectors must strategically interact with one-another (Anderson & Uchida, 2014;
Scheld, Anderson, & Uchida, 2012).
A mechanism anticipating that groups will affiliate and manage themselves
differently became an explicit element of federal management of fisheries.
Amendment 16 of the Northeast Multispecies Management Plan associates a historical
catch level of each regulated species with each harvester, assigns the quota to the
sector joined by the harvester, and allows the sector to manage; harvesters who do not
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join a sector operate in a common pool under legacy days-at-sea regulation. In early
applications, a group of harvesters petitioned management for an allocation of a share
of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) to manage internally, with more flexibility than
harvesters who continue under legacy management (Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear
Sector, 2010; Pinto da Silva & Kitts, 2006; Scheld, Anderson, & Uchida, 2012;
Verani, 2006). The first year saw 17 sectors form, mostly using some form of
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ), along with the common pool (Northeast Fishery
Science Center (NEFSC), 2011). However, even where ITQ systems—expected by
economists to maximize returns—are implemented directly, collective management
often emerges. On the West Coast US, the groundfish fishery implemented a standard
ITQ program, and participants responded by developing collective management
systems and risk pools to manage limiting species that closely resemble cooperatives
reviewed in the self-governance literature (Holland & Jannot, 2012).
Similarly, a mixture of different management systems governing the same
resource stock can be observed in other types of common pool resources. Forest ejidos
in Mexico resulted in a mixture of different stages of privatization of forest nationwide
after the federal government passed the law to allow resource users to convert some
plots of common property forest into private forest (Barnes, 2009; Barsimantov et al.,
2010). From groundwater in California to forest in the Himalayan ranges groups of
resource users adopt management systems suiting the community’s own needs and
preference where possible, creating heterogeneity in management institutions
(Agrawal, 1994; Blomquist, 1992, 1994; Trawick, 2001).
These cases suggest that, while ITQ systems are thought by economists to
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work through the market to produce efficient outcomes, these systems continue to
evolve institutionally after transferable rights are established, and that competitive
markets of arm's length transactions are often a relatively small component of the
management institution that prevails. This raises the question of what properties the
emergent management systems will have. As catch share programs expand, what
predictions can be made about how self-management will evolve, to support biological
and social evaluation mandated through the Environmental Impact Analysis process?
Will they take a consistent form? Or, will they take different forms that result in
improvements in efficiency? Will they be Pareto safe? What sorts of rules for
migrating among sectors facilitate the greatest improvements in efficiency most
quickly?
Theoretical guidance on these questions is scarce, largely because regulatory
processes around the world have focused on trying to implement final structures,
which are restricted to evolve only in very limited ways after they are implemented.
Economic theory generally predicts that rights holders will gravitate toward
institutions with incentives that support efficiency as an equilibrium (Gürerk,
Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006). An alternative set of hypotheses emerges from the
self-governance literature, which offers reasons that users might establish cooperative
institutions (Agrawal, 2002). These cooperative institutions can be efficiency
enhancing even in the absence of individual incentives to do so. While both models
predict efficiency, the resulting institutions differ importantly in attainability,
distributional consequences, or robustness to resource shocks.
To begin developing a framework to address these questions, we designed a
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controlled economic experiment based on the Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot
Program (Anderson & Uchida, 2014; Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector, 2010;
Knapp, 2008; Pinto da Silva & Kitts, 2006; Scheld, Anderson, & Uchida, 2012;
Verani, 2006), featuring a sector managed by individual quota, and a common pool
derby for harvesters who do not join the sector. We allowed harvesters to choose
whether to join the individual quota sector before each season based on the outcomes
they experience under each system. We test the hypothesis that subjects move toward
the individual quota system, which supports the efficient harvesting strategy as
equilibrium, rather than adopt cooperative strategies in a less restrictive common pool
institution, or stay in an inefficiently operating common pool. We then associate
individual variation in the rate of moving to the individual quota system with social
preferences, risk preferences, and a taste for competition.

1.2 Experimental design
Continuous Fishing Game
A two-stage sequential game is repeated for 20 “seasons”, in each of nine
experimental sessions with twelve inexperienced subjects each. In the first stage, all
subjects simultaneously choose to affiliate with either an individual quota (IQ)
group—where each subject receives their quota share as an individual allocation—or a
common pool (CP) managed group—where the quota associated with each subject is
placed in a shared pool to be used be accessed by all subjects choosing CP. In the
second stage, players learn how many others are in each group and then earn money
fishing under the rules of their chosen management group.
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The fishing subgame is a quasi-continuous common-pool resource game with a
contemporaneous price externality, developed by Anderson and Uchida (2014) based
on Walker et al. (1990) and Gardner et al. (1997). The setup is as follows. Consider a
common-pool resource appropriated by 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑁 players. Each player i chooses
effort level 𝑒 and maximizes the following payoff function regardless of choice of
management systems in the first stage:
𝜋𝑖 =

𝑒𝑖
ℎ(𝐸)[𝛼 − 𝛽ℎ(𝐸)] − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖 )
𝐸

where ℎ(∙) is a concave production function, 𝑐(∙) is a linear cost function, and

𝐸 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑖 . The unit price is determined by the term 𝛼 − 𝛽ℎ(𝐸), which decreases in
total landings from all players regardless of management systems. Thus, players can
maximize their profits by fishing in weeks when the total landings are lower.
Assuming identical players and replacing 𝐸 with 𝑛𝑒̅ , the first-order condition is:
1 𝑑ℎ(∙)
𝑑𝑑(∙)
𝑁−1
𝑑𝑑(∙)
�
𝑃(𝑁𝑒̅ ) + ℎ(𝑁𝑒̅)
� + 2 ℎ(𝑁𝑒̅ )𝑃(𝑁𝑒̅ ) −
=0
𝑁 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
𝑁 𝑒̅
𝑑𝑑

where 𝑃(𝑁𝑒̅) = 𝛼 − 𝛽ℎ(𝑁𝑒̅).

When 𝑁 = 1, the equilibrium is optimal; marginal revenue equals marginal cost.

When 𝑁 > 1, the equilibrium is no longer optimal and the equilibrium effort increases
up to where average revenue equals marginal cost.

We apply the model to a fishery within a season of 𝑡 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑇 weeks

(Gardner, Moore, & Walker, 1997). Following Anderson and Uchida (2014), we
assume zero discount rate and no stock effect on the harvest function. The
maximization problem becomes:
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𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑒𝑖𝑖 , 𝑇

𝑇

𝑒𝑖𝑖
ℎ(𝐸𝑡 )[𝛼 − 𝛽ℎ(𝐸𝑡 )] − 𝑐(𝑒𝑖𝑖 )�
𝐸𝑡

𝜋𝑖𝑖 = � �
𝑡=1

subject to

0 ≤ 𝑒𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑇 ≤ 𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚

∑𝑇𝑡=1 ℎ(𝐸𝑡 ) ≤ 𝑚𝑞� for a CP group
∑𝑇𝑡=1 ℎ(𝑒𝑖𝑖 ) ≤ 𝑞� for IQ players.

CP and IQ players face the same maximization problem except that their total harvest
for a season is constrained to collective quota for players under CP management and
individual quota for IQ management.
Consider the specific parameter values chosen for the game (Table 1.1). In the
parameterization used, subgame perfect equilibrium is for all identical players to
choose IQ, and play a Nash equilibrium strategy of constant average effort of 1.92
days in all weeks in the continuous fishing game. The symmetric Nash equilibrium
under CP management is, regardless of m, at 𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚 , which is less than at a point where
average revenue equals marginal cost. Notice that a Total Allowable Catch (TAC)

quota (= 𝑁𝑞�) is “binding”; a TAC is relatively scarce compared to a potential total

catch (= 𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚 ℎ(𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚 )). In such a case, the optimal harvesting strategy for IQ players

is to time the landings to equalize the total landings from both groups throughout a

season and thus ℎ(𝐸 ∗ ) = 𝑁𝑞� ⁄𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚 . Table 1.2 presents all Nash equilibria contingent

on an outcome of management choice in the first stage.
Measurement of Risk Preferences

To explain variation in management choices, subjects completed three
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supplemental instruments. To measure risk attitudes, we used a elicitation method for
risk aversion by Holt and Laury (2002). Players choose which lottery to enter, either
“safe” or “risky,” for every pair of ten pairs (Table 1.3). The stakes are $2 and $1.60
for the “safe” lottery and $3.85 and $0.10 for the “risky” lottery. The probability of
winning the higher payoffs in both lotteries starts with ten percent and increases.
Conversely, the probability of winning the lower payoffs in both lotteries starts with
90 percent and decreases. Players switch at some point from the “safe” lottery to the
“risky” lottery. This switch identifies the range of relative risk aversion. While risk
seeking players switch to the “risky” option before the expected utility of the “risky”
lottery is less than the “safe” lottery, risk averse players stick to the “safe” option even
after the expected utility of the “safe” lottery is greater than the “risky” lottery.
Measurement of Other-regarding Preferences
We conducted the ultimatum game for the stake of $10. In the two-player
ultimatum game, one player is designated as a “Proposer” and makes an offer to divide
$10 between oneself and the other player. If the other player designated as a
“Responder” accepts the offer, the payoffs for the two players are realized as
proposed. If a “Responder” rejects the offer, both get nothing. In the strategy method
of the ultimatum game subjects are asked for their contingent behaviour in both roles,
choosing an offer from $0 to $10 in an increment of $1 as a Proposer and responding
to every possible proposal as a Responder. Subjects are randomly paired and assigned
a role after all decisions are made. Although the prediction of the game is that a selfinterested “Proposer” gives the smallest amount of money to the “Responder” and the
“Responder” accepts any amount because even the smallest amount is better than
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nothing, low offers in the ultimatum game were frequently rejected (Camerer &
Thaler, 1995; Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, & Zamir, 1991). Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) modeled this seemingly irrational behaviour and defined fairness as inequality
aversion and incorporated the idea that some people experience disutility from unequal
distribution of payoffs. We derived individual inequality aversion parameters
following Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s two-player model for inequality aversion as
follows:
𝑈𝑖 (𝑥) = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 , 0� − 𝛽𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0�,

𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,

where 𝑥 is the amount of money received. The responses as a Proposer in the

ultimatum game identify the coefficient 𝛼𝑖 , which represents the degree of utility loss
from disadvantageous inequality.

Measurement of Preference for Competition
We used the psychological survey developed by Smither & Houston (1992)
and Houston et al. (2002). Subjects completed a five-point Likert-scale survey
instrument on attitudes toward competition (Table 1.4), with nine questions yielding
an index of enjoyment of competition in the range of 9 to 45 (most enjoyment) and
five questions forming an index of contentiousness from 5 to 25 (most contentious).
We used this survey instead of other commonly used surveys for competitiveness such
as Work and Family Orientation Questionnaire (Helmreich & Spence, 1978) because
our interests are not competition in a specific context such as work or selfachievement but in general attitude toward competition.
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Procedures
The experiment took place at Policy Simulation Laboratory at University of
Rhode Island during the semesters of fall 2011 and spring 2012. Each session lasted
approximately two hours with twelve participants, who were recruited through
undergraduate economics classes. In total nine sessions were conducted, which
produced a sample of 107 subjects (one subject did not complete the experiment).
Subjects were paid a $5 appearance fee, plus earnings from three random fishing
games, one random lottery, and the ultimatum game. Subjects started with the
ultimatum game using pencils and paper, and then played the two-stage fishing game
over a local computer network facilitated by a Java based software (Figure 1.1). After
the tenth round of the fishing game the survey for competition was conducted in a
paper-based format, and the rest of the game resumed. Finally the lottery choice was
administered through VeconLab (http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/introduction.php).
The Appendix contains the written instructions for the two-stage fishing game.

1.3 Data analysis
Figure 1.5 shows the frequency of subjects' choosing IQ rises from half in the first two
seasons (mean = 51.9%; SE = 3.4%) to over 80 percent of subjects in the last two
seasons (mean = 83.3%; SE = 2.5%). More than 40 percent of the subjects consistently
chose IQ during later seasons (mean = 43.5%; SE = 4.8% for seasons 11-20). A small
portion of the subjects, less than 5 percent, never tried the CP management and
remained in IQ throughout the session (mean = 4.6%; SE = 2.0% for all seasons).
About 14 percent of the subjects persistently—twice or more in the last five seasons—
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chose CP even at the end of the sessions (mean = 13.9%; SE = 3.3% for seasons 1620).
Subjects employ different fishing strategies based on their own management
group (two-tailed Mann-Whitney z = -24.690, P = 1.37e-134), and the number of
subjects choosing CP, consistent with equilibrium predictions (Figure 1.2). Mixedeffects model for predicting mean effort level in IQ suggests that subjects smooth out
effort throughout the season from 2.21 days at week 1 to 1.86 days at the last week
when all subjects are in IQ (11 or 12 subjects picked IQ in 23 of 90 seasons) (Table
1.5). The dependent variable, 𝑒̅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , is mean effort level in management choice i, week
t, season k, session j. Included in regression are a week trend variable, a binary

variable to indicate whether the CP fishery is open at week t, and a binary variable that
takes 1 if the number of subjects in IQ is 10 and greater or 0 otherwise.
𝑒̅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑖1 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖2 𝐶𝐶_𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖3 𝐼𝐼_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖4 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
× 𝐶𝐶_𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖5 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼_𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖6 𝐼𝐼_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖
× 𝐶𝐶_𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖7 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐼𝐼_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶_𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

The same model for CP shows that when subjects choose CP, they fish intensively, but
the derby is less intense than the 7 days predicted, and thus CP closure is 2-3 weeks
later than predicted (Table 1.5). IQ subjects respond to the CP derby by holding back
effort, increasing by 1.66 days after CP closure.
Subjects’ movement toward IQ follows significantly higher profits (Figure 1.5,
right axis) (Mann-Whitney test, z = -13.773, P = 3.705e-43, two-tailed), with IQ
subjects earning more (mean = $71,092; SE = 181) than CP subjects (mean = $61,218;
SE = 875). Regardless of the number of subjects that choose CP, average profits in IQ
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are higher (Figure 1.3). CP subjects earned less on average but with a greater
variability. We estimated profits and standard deviation of profits using mixed effects
model with heteroskedastic errors (Table 1.6). The dependent variables, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖 and

𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 , are subject i’s profit earned in session k, season t and standard deviation of

profits in session k, season t, respectively. Included in regression are a season trend
variable, a binary variable to indicate whether a subject is in IQ at season t, and the
number of subjects in CP excluding oneself at season t. The model is allowed to
produce systematically different error variance between CP and IQ.
2
+ 𝛽3 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖
2
× 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽6 𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖

2
𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑘𝑘
+ 𝛽3 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 + 𝛽4 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘
2
+ 𝛽5 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 × 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽6 𝐶𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽7 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑘 × 𝐶𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑘
𝑘
+ 𝑢𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘𝑘

The results indicate an additional subject choosing CP reduces CP subject

profits by $1,390, and increases IQ subject profits by $1,230 (Table 1.6). This controls
for the number of CP subjects, and a significant effect of experience, wherein average
profits increase linearly over time by $1,150 per season. However, profits in CP range
from considerably less than in IQ, to considerably more (Figure 1.3). CP subjects have
significantly greater within-season profit variance, with a standard deviation $17,267
higher than IQ (Table 1.6). The median difference between season top and bottom CP
profits during the last 10 seasons is $17,185 whereas in IQ is $11,383. In the same
period, 42 percent (38 out of 90 seasons) of the top season earnings was by CP
subjects, and 15 different individuals contributed to this high earnings in CP. Among
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90 season top earnings, the median in 38 CP profits is $91,400 and in 52 IQ profits is
$77,633.
The choice of management groups (1 if IQ; 0 if CP) is modeled with a random
effects logit model. Explanatory variables include the coefficient of constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) from the lottery choice game; the parameter of inequality
aversion from the ultimatum game; two psychological competitiveness indices; the
profit the subject received last time she fished in IQ minus the profit last time she
fished in CP (substituting the mean for inexperienced subjects); the number of subjects
in CP in the previous season excluding oneself; and binary catch, which is coded 1 if
in the previous season the subject was in CP and caught more than her 3000lb IQ
quota, or 0 otherwise (Tables 1.7-1.8).
𝑃𝑃(𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼)
= 𝐹�𝛽0 + 𝛽𝜔1 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝜔2 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝜔3 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝜔4 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝜔5 𝐶𝐶_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝜔6 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽𝜔7 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑖 �

The dependent variable, 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖 is subject i’s choice of management system in
session k, season t and takes 1 if choosing IQ or 0 if CP.

Each independent variable is interacted with both an increasing and a
decreasing sigmoid function of season number (with estimated switchover point) to
capture the evolution of the role of the explanatory variables as subjects gain
experience in each management institution (Myagkov & Plott, 1997).
Sigmoid function: 𝜔 = 1⁄�1 + 𝑒 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝛽)∗𝛼 �

The parameter 𝛼 takes an arbitrary value 1 for the decreasing function and −𝛼 for the
increasing function. The parameter 𝛽 determines the slope of the curve and thus the
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switchover point of the two curves. The model estimation for different values of 𝛽 is
shown in Table 1.9. Figure 1.4 shows the final form of the Sigmoid function.

This model identifies the factors that are most explanatory of management
choice (Table 1.10, Figure 1.6). The difference between the subjects’ most recently
experienced profit in each system is the only variable significant across seasons at
conventional levels: a marginal increase in difference between IQ and CP profits
increases the probability of choosing IQ by 2.1% in early seasons. This increase
reaches 4.7% as subjects gain experience and experiment less over time. The only
other explanatory variable that is significant among experienced subjects is the
Enjoyment of Competition index, where a marginal increase in the Enjoyment of
Competition subscale decreases the probability of choosing IQ by 5.4%.
This also resonates with the fact that those who opted into CP still raced to fish
even when no one else was in CP. When there is only one subject in CP, it is
practically the same as everyone being in IQ; yet, a good number of the subjects in CP
when they are the only one in the group exerted their effort differently from the rest of
the subjects who opted into IQ (two-tailed Mann-Whitney z = -6.049, P = 1.457e-9).
Forty two percent of the subjects in CP when everyone else is in IQ finished their
quota by the week of 20, which implies that their harvesting strategies closely
followed the Nash equilibrium in CP that results in a closure of the fishery in the week
of 15.
Other variables are not significant drivers of long-run preferences for IQ. In
early seasons when subjects are experimenting, inequality aversion is low-level
significant—and shows more inequality averse people choosing the more unequal
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CP—but the effect is insignificant after the early experimentation phase. Despite a
clear mean-variance tradeoff, CRRA is nominally small and does not significantly
explain choice. The quantity of catch is insignificant, reflecting that subjects are likely
focusing on profit rather than quantity in their decision. The number of (other) CP
subjects in the previous season shifts from increasing the chance of choosing CP by
six percent—following a herd into CP—in the early seasons, to decreasing it by six
percent as subjects find small CPs more profitable, but is insignificant throughout.

1.4 Discussion
Although subjects could have chosen inefficient collective use of a resource
appropriation right, an overwhelming majority of subjects moved systematically
toward the institution with stronger property rights, individual quotas. This modified
their harvesting strategy and moved the aggregate harvest pattern close to the optimal
pattern that would be pursued by a sole owner, which increased prices received,
harvester profitability, and efficiency. Rhode Island fluke sector pilot program, the
motivating case of this manuscript, also went through a similar change during its
three-year existence. The pilot program began with eight boat owners occupying
11.53% of the state’s allocation, and the membership size grew to 13 receiving 15.7%
of the allocation as more boat owners decided to join after witnessing higher profits
and more flexible operation by the members (Scheld, Anderson, & Uchida, 2012;
Wilson, 2012).
However, a persistent minority of subjects remained in the common pool,
earning lower profits, and the Rhode Island fluke fishermen who did not join the
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sector continued to opt to operate under the conventional regulatory scheme. These
subjects did so intentionally, knowingly foregoing the higher profits they—
individually—earned in seasons when they chose an individual allocation of quota.
This behavior is explicable as an expression of a taste for competition, as captured by
the Enjoyment of Competition index in the Houston et al. instrument.
That fishermen have a preference for competition is not new, and regret at the
loss of a competitive element is sometimes expressed following rationalization; it is no
surprise that competitive people would select into derby fishing as an occupation.
Even under the management system such as revenue sharing arrangement, in which
competition is disincentivised, anecdotal evidence suggests that fishers still like to
compete under such system (Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Manuscript
2 in this dissertation). This may be an important insight into how or why complete
individual allocation is difficult to implement in its totality in many fisheries, despite a
track record of higher incomes. The combination of people unsure about the system
(96% of subjects tried the common pool at some point) and those who derive utility
from the inefficient aspects of the old system may prevent implementation as a final
measure. However, a catch share system where groups receive allocations they can
manage in any way they choose allows those willing to give up some income for other
aspects of the job or lifestyle to affiliate and do so. It also provides easy, nonregulatory reversibility; if it turns out an individual does not find a legacy management
group to their liking, they can switch to another group with a different management
system.
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Thus, the outcome observed from the catch share system moved strongly
toward, but not all the way to, the sole owner solution. However, since not all
harvesters had to adopt the individual quota, the catch share provided an additional
degree of Pareto safety—preserving the element of competition for those harvesters
who value it over marginal income—and made implementation and significant
aggregate welfare gains possible. To agencies whose objectives encompass outcomes
to populations beyond harvesters, the persistence of inefficiencies attributable to utility
maximization of harvesters who prefer inefficient systems can be worrisome.
However, the pattern that this persistence diminishes—without regulatory
intervention—as the catch share system matures may provide solace.
More broadly, the present experiment suggests effort spend articulating and
implementing many details of management systems is unnecessary; in cases where
building consensus or political majorities around these details delays or prevents
reform, it is destructive. Rather, management institutions continue to evolve when the
managed parties have sufficient flexibility in the use of the right, even a right they can
transfer.
This is the self-governance literature’s fundamental insight, viewed through a
different lens; under the right conditions, users of a resource can develop governance
systems that support sustainable rent generation. However, many of the case studies
emphasize the community, taking the properties of the resource as exogenous. Some
of the key enabling resource properties can be functionally implemented with a right;
even collective quotas provide well-defined boundaries of both the resource and the
user group. Their role in Ostrom’s framework is to facilitate consensus about who can
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access the resource, predicate to establishing consensus around use levels. With the
aggregate level of extraction determined, and thus the sustainability problem resolved,
other community factors can then be brought to bear on harvesting the resource for
rent maximization. This does not conflict with the self-governance, but rather shows
how the benefits of self-governance can work in a broader set of cases, cases much
more typical of commercial fishery resource users worldwide.
Given current tensions in the social science of resource management literature,
it would be a terrific irony if the key to implementing community-based selfgovernance was a weak individual property right, along with sufficient autonomy to
determine how it is exercised. While it was the preferred institution in the limited
choice set available in this experiment, this is not to argue that strong individual
property rights are the solution for the sector-based management. Cooperatives that
pool or collectively manage individual allocations are common; Chignik was designed
to facilitate cost-reducing coordination among the collective allocations, and in the
West Coast US groundfish fishery, large heterogeneous groups of harvesters initially
allocated individual transferable rights have pooled some of them to manage choke
species (Holland and Jannot 2012), and some smaller groups have fully pooled quota,
adopting cost minimizing coordinated harvest strategies (e.g., Ilwaco Fishermen
Marketing Cooperative). To implement collective catch shares more effectively,
however, we need theory and research to understand the conditions under which
sectors managed by catch shares initially adopt one management system rather than
another, and how those systems evolve as users gain experience with their chosen
system, and observe outcomes under others.
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Table 1.1 Parameters for continuous fishing game.
Number of subjects
Maximum effort level
Number of weeks
Individual Quota (lbs)
Collective Quota (lbs)
Cost function
Harvest function
Parameters

N
𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑞�
𝑚𝑞�
𝑐(∙)
ℎ(∙)
𝛼
𝛽
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12
7
52
3,000
𝑚 is number of CP subjects
500 ∗ 𝑒𝑖𝑖
30 ∗ 𝑒𝑖𝑖
50
0.012

Table 1.2 Nash equilibrium in the
continuous fishing subgame,
conditioned on the outcome of
management choice. The parameters
used are specified in Table 1.1. The
strategy for IQ specifies mixed
strategy because of multiple pure
strategy equilibria. Resulting profits
are derived by pure strategy. When
there are 11 subjects in IQ and 1
subject in CP, it is strategically the
same as all subjects in IQ and thus
combined together. *This indicates
the mean of the profits derived by
pure strategy Nash equilibria.
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Table 1.3 Lottery choice

Source: Holt & Laury (2002), p. 1645.
Table 1.4 Competitiveness index. *This indicates reverse scored.

Source: Houston et al. (2002)
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Table 1.5 Mixed-effects model estimation of weekly mean effort level. In parenthesis
are z score. The data used include the observations from the last half of the sessions,
season 11 to 20. The first and last three weeks of each season are excluded in
regression.
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Table 1.6 Heteroskadastic mixed-effects model estimation. In parenthesis are z score.

Table 1.7 Summary statistics. Infinity for inequality aversion parameter is replaced
with linear extrapolation. For profit difference, missing value until you experience
both choices is replaced with the mean profit of the group in the season.

37

Table 1.8 Correlation matrix of explanatory variables.

Table 1.9 Selection of the parameter for the Sigmoid function. The model is the same
as Table 1.10. N=Obs used in calculating BIC.
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Table 1.10 Random Effects Logit Model of Choice of IQ. All variables are
standardized except for binary catch. In parenthesis are z score. AME denotes average
marginal effects.
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Participants come
into lab

Continuous fishing
game for 10 rounds

Read instructions for
lottery choice

Read written
instructions for the
ultimatum game

Answer the survey

Lottery choice

One-shot ultimatum
game

Continuous fishing
game for 10 rounds

Receive cash based
on performance

Read written
instructions for
continuous fishing
game

One practice round
with CP management

Leave lab

Figure 1.1 Flow of experiment.
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Figure 1.2 Choice of management group, and corresponding profits, over time.
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A.

B.

Figure 1.3 Comparison between Predictions and Observations. The data used include
the observations from the last half of the sessions, season 11 to 20. Blue colour stands
for IQ and red for CP. Shaded areas are observations and lines are predictions. (A)
Shown is the mean of days per week across the two outcomes: all subjects in IQ and
10 subjects in IQ (2 subjects in CP). (B) Shown is the mean of days per week across
the three outcomes: 9 subjects in IQ (3 in CP), 8 subjects in IQ (2 in CP), and 7
subjects in IQ (5 in CP).
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Figure 1.4 Distribution of profits by each management outcome. The data used include
the observations from the last half of the sessions, season 11 to 20.

Figure 1.5 Weight for the two estimates when 𝛽 = 10.
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Figure 1.6 Average Marginal Effect. Shown is average change in the probability of
choosing IQ, caused by a marginal increase in the named independent variable. All
explanatory variables except for the binary catch are X-standardized and, for timevarying variables, standardized by standard deviation at the corresponding time.
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Appendix 1.1 Additional Analysis

Estimating Group Choice
How risk attitudes influence choice is uncertain throughout the session (Table 1.10).
Choosing CP can accompany opportunity of earning tremendous profits that are not
usually possible in IQ. Maximum profit earned in CP is twice as great as the mean of
profits in IQ during the last ten seasons. This may drive risk seeking subjects towards
CP. Risk attitudes can act on when subjects see such a chance in CP by experiencing
greater standard deviation in CP relative to IQ. To further investigate, we estimated
the same random-effects logit model but with two subcategories for risk attitudes
instead of a single coefficient: risk seeking subjects and risk averse subjects both
interacted with the original coefficient and the level of relative dispersion of profits in
the previous season (Tables 1.11, 1.12). The level of relative dispersion of profits is
defined as difference between estimation of standard deviation of CP and IQ profits
across all sessions in the previous season. This longer model is expected to capture
different responses from risk seekers and averters on different levels of profit
dispersion. However, we did not find any evidence of risk attitudes influencing choice
(Table 1.12).
Although it is significant for early seasons, the implication of the
disadvantageous inequality aversion variable is puzzling. Marginal increase in the
coefficient decreases the probability of choosing IQ by 4.1 percent at the beginning of
the sessions, all things equal. As fishing in CP results in a wider profit distribution,
more inequality averse subjects are expected to select IQ to avoid such inequality.
However, the estimation suggests the opposite during early seasons. The less averse
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subjects are to disadvantageous inequality, the more likely they are to choose IQ. If it
in fact captures the level of aversion to disadvantageous inequality, this coefficient
should be in play when subjects earn fewer profits than their expectation.
The degree of inequality aversion may matter as more inequality averse
subjects may respond differently from less inequality averse subjects. The coefficient
of inequality aversion takes six values (0, 0.125, 0.334, 0.75, 2, infinity) with the
percent of each value (2.8%, 12%, 2.8%, 13.9%, 34.3%, 34.3%). Non-parametric test
suggests that the coefficient of 2 and greater make distinct choice from others (MannWhitney test, z = 5.140, P = 2.747e-07, two-tailed). In addition, differentiating a kind
of inequality subjects experienced can improve the estimation, and subjects at
different degrees of inequality aversion can react distinctly to various kinds of
inequality. We divided inequality aversion into two categories: advantageous
inequality and disadvantageous inequality. Advantageous inequality is defined as a
difference of experienced profit minus estimated profit if experienced profit is greater
than estimation and 0 otherwise. Similarly disadvantageous inequality is defined as a
difference of estimated profit minus experienced profit if estimated profit is greater
than own experience and 0 otherwise. We created the two variables each in CP and IQ
(Table 1.11). Finally we interacted the parameter of inequality aversion with two
binary variables indicating the degree of inequality aversion and four kinds of
inequality in all combinations, yielding eight variables in total (Table 1.12).
We estimated the same random-effects logit model, breaking down a single
coefficient into subcategories based on whether or not a subject is more inequality
averse and whether or not a subject experienced disadvantageous (or advantageous)
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inequality of profits in IQ (or CP) in the previous season (Table 1.12). According to
this model significance during initial seasons is attributable to the behaviour when
more inequality averse subjects face disadvantageous inequality in CP. The experience
of having been taken advantage of in CP can make more inequality averse subjects
emotional, which drives them into the seemingly irrational choice (Koenigs & Tranel,
2007). More inequality averse subjects, who rejected low offers in the ultimatum
game, were identified as possessing higher testosterone levels, suggesting that they are
more aggressive, emotional, and dominant (Burnham, 2007). The results suggest that
emotion plays an important role in economic decision-making as discussed in Camerer
(2003) and Sanfey et al. (2003).
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Table 1.11. Summary statistics for additional variables. The subscript n represents
session and j season.
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Table 1.12. Comparison of Random Effects Logit Models for Choice of IQ. All
variables are standardized except for binary variables. In parenthesis are z score.

49

MANUSCRIPT – 2
How Can Community-Based Management Improve An Outcome? The Effects of
Revenue Sharing and Social Capital in a Fishery
In preparation for journal submission
by
Mihoko Tegawa 1, Hirotsugu Uchida1, and Christopher M. Anderson 2

1
2

Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island
School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, University of Washington

50

How Can Community-Based Management Improve an Outcome? The Effects of
Revenue Sharing and Social Capital in a Fishery
Mihoko Tegawa and Hirotsugu Uchida
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
University of Rhode Island
Christopher M. Anderson
School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences
University of Washington
Abstract
We empirically decompose the effects on management outcomes in common-pool
resource management into three: the direct effect of management systems, the direct
effect of social capital, and the indirect effect of management systems and social
capital interacting each other to influence the outcomes. In particular, we focus on
revenue sharing arrangement as a possible management tool in a fishery, in which a
group of harvesters shares catch and/or revenue among the members of a fishery
cooperative. In addition to each of revenue sharing and social capital influencing a
fishery independently we hypothesize the synergy between revenue sharing and social
capital. Social capital potentially affects the efficiency that revenue sharing brings
while revenue sharing can foster social capital, which eventually leads to better
management outcomes. An important intermediary between the two factors and the
outcomes is collective efforts performed as a group often in a community-managed
fishery. This paper provides the first rigorous analysis to measure the effect of revenue
sharing and social capital and to identify the mechanism, through which revenue
sharing and social capital affect the outcomes of a fishery. We quantified social capital
using controlled economic experiments with fisherman subjects as well as surveys.
Using the data collected from ten Japanese fishery groups and wild cluster bootstrap
for small sample inference, we find evidence of the indirect effect of both revenue
sharing and social capital interacting to affect the fishery in information network. .
However, we find no robust evidence of the direct effect of revenue sharing improving
an outcome in a fishery. The results also show that fishery groups achieving economic
success are comprised of fishers with higher general trusting attitudes and fishery
groups achieving better stock conditions consists of fishers having similar information
network size.
Key words: community-based management, partnership, fishery cooperatives, social
capital
JEL: C23, C93, Q22
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2.1 Introduction
The importance of community-based management has been long recognized for
successful governance of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2002). Contrary to
Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968) or Olson’s Logic of Collective Action
(1965), empirical research has found many successfully self-governing communities
through extensive case study (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1989).
This is no exception in fisheries (Pinkerton, 1994). Fishery cooperatives, where
fishermen collectively manage the fishery, has been garnering much attention from
both regulators and academics as a way to complement and/or supplement existing
management systems such as rights-based management (Deacon, 2012; Townsend,
Shotton, & Uchida, 2008). In fact, Northeast multispecies groundfish fishery in US
has implemented a sector management system, in which voluntarily formed subgroups of harvesters may manage their collective total share of the harvest as a group
right (Pinto da Silva & Kitts, 2006). Thus, understanding how and why fishery
cooperatives succeed is not only important but also timely in terms of policy
relevance.
Revenue sharing arrangement is a type of management rule in a fishery, in
which harvesters share catch and divide equally the resulting revenue among the
members of a fishery cooperative, regardless of how much each harvester contributed.
Employment of such arrangement is a collective action that a group of harvesters
takes. The role of revenue sharing in fisheries management has been examined in the
literature (e.g. Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008),
but less studied are the quantitative effect of revenue sharing and its mechanism,
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through which revenue sharing arrangement attains success. In this paper we
hypothesize the interaction between revenue sharing and social capital; revenue
sharing augments social capital in a community and among fishers, and social capital
also influences various incentives possibly induced under revenue sharing and the
efficiency that such arrangement brings.
This paper provides the first rigorous analysis on measuring the direct effects
of revenue sharing and social capital in a community-managed fishery, and identifies
the indirect effects resulting from the interaction between revenue sharing and social
capital. An important intermediary between the two factors, revenue sharing
arrangement and social capital, and the outcomes of a fishery is collective efforts
defined as any efforts performed as a group to increase harvesting performance of a
fishery. The efforts include stock enhancement, rotation of fishing grounds, collective
search for schools of fish, exchange of information, and collective use of fishing boats
and/or fishing gear. Revenue sharing arrangement and social capital enhance the effect
of the collective efforts, which leads to efficient and sustainable use of resources in the
long run. Contribution to the group efforts aligns with self-interest when a group of
harvesters shares revenue and harvesters are devoted to collective value due to social
capital in a community.
Social capital is a concept that attributes such as trust, cooperation, and
reciprocity among people, and norms and networks in a community are important in
improving economic life (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2001). Consensus has been
established as to importance and influence of social capital in economic analysis
(Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2001) although some skepticism as an analytical concept—
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how social capital should be incorporated in an economic model—has been expressed
(Arrow, 2001; Solow, 2001). In particular, the role of social capital in a community
that self-governs a community resource has been highlighted (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008;
Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011; Pretty, 2003). In fact,
Carpenter and Seki (2011) showed a strong correlation between fishermen’s
propensity to cooperate and fishing productivity. Social capital is also found to be
empirically associated with economic productivity in other workplace (e.g. Barr &
Serneels, 2009; Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carter & Castillo, 2002; Karlan,
2005; Knack & Keefer, 1997).
Revenue sharing arrangement induces conflicting incentives within a fisher:
free-riding on others’ fishing effort and maximizing collective value (Kandel &
Lazear, 1992). Theoretically free-riding on other’s fishing efforts dominates one’s
incentive in a sufficiently large organization because marginal return from free-riding
is usually greater than its cost. However, shirking behaviors (to become lazy by
sharing revenue and not exert excessive effort) in a commons tragedy situation can
increase efficiency. As to why revenue sharing arrangement may not induce
disproportionate shirking, Gaspart & Seki (2003) attributed to status seeking among
fishermen, which counteracted against excessive shirking in fishing effort.
Heintzelman et al. (2009) balanced an individual incentive to free ride in own effort
and intra-group competition, which prevented excess harvesting and increased
efficiency.
Empirical findings identified the important roles of the collective efforts in
revenue sharing groups. The collective efforts are a source of efficiency that can be
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brought by revenue sharing because they are expected to generate synergies, which is
key in a partnership structure such as revenue sharing arrangement (Sherstyuk, 1998).
By aligning self-interest with a group interest revenue sharing supports an incentive to
contribute to the collective efforts, which bring synergies and lead to successful
management of a fishery. Platteau and Seki (2001) emphasized importance of the
collective efforts such as synchronization of fishing effort, collective net repair, and
exchange of information in Japanese grass-shrimp fishery with revenue sharing.
Another revenue sharing group in Japanese small pink shrimp fishery identified joint
marketing and harvest control as a significant motive of sharing revenue as well as
major contribution to increased efficiency (Uchida & Baba, 2008).
Social capital can sustain individual fishers’ contribution to the collective
efforts. Assuming that all fishery groups engage in some form of the collective efforts,
how much time and effort each group and each individual within a group put for these
collective efforts can vary. Among many aspects of social capital the focus in this
paper is on cooperation, trust, and information network. Cooperative relationships
fishers have in a fishery group can make a difference in the level of contribution
because fishers can be inherently cooperative to each other or can be more cooperative
knowing that other fishers are also cooperative. Similarly general trusting nature of
fishers can affect the level of contribution because they may trust others for
contributing as well. Having greater information networks in a community in density
and in scale may also increase the level of contribution because fishers may know
each other’s harvesting behaviors, which may enable them to contribute in such a way
that the benefits from contributing can accrue to themselves.
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Importance of social capital and more broadly immaterial motivation in
economic decision-making has been stressed in the literature, especially in behavioral
economics. Behavioral response to monetary incentives sometimes does not align with
regulator’s intention as referred as crowding out (Cardenas et al., 2000). In the worst
case economic incentives may undermine individual voluntary motivation to
contribute to a better world (Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman, 2012). These studies
suggest that immaterial incentives, in addition to economic factors such as production
technology as shown in Kaya and Vereshchagina (2014), can play an important role in
ensuring success of revenue sharing. For example, each harvester may contribute to
the collective efforts rather than free-ride because of moral or reputation among
fishers, which has been shown to overcome moral hazard (e.g. Bénabou & Tirole,
2006; Brekke et al., 2003; Gaspart & Seki, 2003). Trust or reciprocity among
members, or social norms can support individual motivation to make sincere
commitment to a group interest.
Not only do these two factors, revenue sharing and social capital, support an
incentive to contribute to the collective efforts separately, but also through the
interaction with social capital revenue sharing further enhances the effect of the
collective efforts, and through the interaction with revenue sharing social capital
strengthens a team for the collective efforts. The collective efforts motivated by
revenue sharing and social capital bring synergies in fishing, which reinforces the
indirect effect of both of revenue sharing and social capital. In other words, greater
social capital among fishers financially bound by revenue sharing can strengthen the
effect of the collective efforts, which generates the indirect effect of revenue sharing
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and social capital. For example, revenue sharing fishers can be encouraged to share
more information on hot-spots to increase the productivity of fishing as a group.
Fishery groups may collectively decide to remove predators for a targeting species;
fishery groups with more cooperative fishers may spend more time for this collective
task and they may do so more likely if they share revenue. Fishery groups with higher
levels of general trust may collectively repair fishing gears more often without
revenue sharing arrangement, but with revenue arrangement and trusting nature of
fishers fishery groups may even collectively use fishing gear let alone repair them. In
all these examples revenue sharing and social capital can directly affect the outcomes
in a fishery but also they can influence them indirectly by enhancing the effect of each
other.
This paper formally tests the effect of revenue sharing and social capital
separately on the four measurements of the outcomes in a fishery: ex-vessel price per
kilogram (economic outcome), resource stock density measured per squared meter
(biological outcome), economic success perceived by fishers, and resource conditions
perceived by fishers. In addition, this paper also tests the pathway, through which
revenue sharing and social capital interact each other to affect the outcomes indirectly.
Together this paper provides the first rigorous analysis to measure the effects of
different management systems and different levels of social capital in a communitymanaged fishery and to identify how economic systems and social aspects of a
community affect the outcomes of a fishery. The collective efforts performed as a
group in a fishery mediates between the outcomes in a fishery and the two factors,
revenue sharing arrangement and social capital.
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Utilizing both numeric data and perceived scales for measurement of the
outcomes this paper achieves comprehensive analysis of management outcomes. The
data were collected in Japan, which is one of the countries that have a long history of
community-based fisheries management (Yamamoto, 1995) as well as ample cases of
revenue sharing. Many Japanese fisheries operating under revenue sharing have been
successfully managing the resources as well as generating resource rents (Carpenter &
Seki, 2011; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). To quantify cooperation
controlled economic experiments with fisherman subjects were conducted. As for trust
and information network indices are constructed from survey responses of the same
fisherman subjects. Using wild cluster bootstrapped p-values for small sample
inference, we rigorously quantify the effect of revenue sharing and social capital in a
reduced form. In addition, we explore the mechanism, through which those factors
interact with each other and affect the outcomes in a fishery.

2.2. Conceptual Framework
A fishery possesses various externalities inflicted by individual harvesting decisions.
Theoretical studies incorporated them as stock and crowding externalities, and
demonstrated how these externalities can cause rent dissipation in fisheries (e.g. Clark,
1980; Smith, 1969). In a static common pool resource environment, equilibrium is
achieved where average revenue from exploitation equals to its average cost because a
harvester can establish the right over the resource only by exploiting it (common
property externality) (Walker, Gardner, & Ostrom, 1990). In a dynamic fishery
environment, spatial, contemporaneous, and temporal production externalities need to
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be incorporated (Clark, 1980; Homans & Wilen, 2005; Smith, 1969). Harvesting adult
fish in the current period can alter reproductive ability of the fish population for the
following year while harvesting young fish may not be profitable (stock externality).
Heterogeneous returns to effort across fishing locations may drive harvesters to fish
more in some locations than others, but harvesters do not consider the cost of their
participation in a particular location to others when choosing their fishing site
(crowding externality). Similarly, the return to effort at a particular time may vary
depending on the total amount of output produced at that time (contemporaneous
externality) (Anderson & Uchida, 2014; Huang & Smith, 2014; Scheld, Anderson, &
Uchida, 2012).
There is no single all-round remedy that can solve the externalities in fisheries
all at once. A catch share system or an individual transferable quota (ITQ), spreading
over the US fisheries as a promising management tool, has been shown that it can
fully internalize the common property externality by setting the price of a quota at
shadow value of a fishery (Arnason, 1990; Danielsson, 2000; Grafton, 1996). It is
uncertain, however, how ITQs can address the other types of externalities (Boyce,
1992; Copes, 1986).
Revenue sharing arrangement in this study features a group of harvesters who
share revenue equally regardless of how much each harvester contributes but not the
costs of fishing operations including the cost of the collective efforts (Gaspart & Seki,
2003). This arrangement is different from a sole owner-like arrangement as in the one
implemented in Chignik Salmon Cooperative (Knapp, 2008). Thus, the arrangement
itself does not guarantee social optimum. The assumption that individual harvesters
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incur costs of fishing operations is consistent with many Japanese fisheries under
revenue sharing, and it will be relevant and realistic to other fisheries. Fishermen will
start sharing revenue with others with a fishing boat and gear of a different size,
horsepower, and age, and thus different fuel efficiency. This difference may continue
to exist even after implementation of revenue sharing because of the other fisheries
that the members engage separately.
Harvesters’ incentives under revenue sharing arrangement can be different
from open-access fisheries in three ways. First, the common-property externality can
be overcome because individual harvesters are no longer motivated to rush to fish to
claim the right to own the fish; all the landings in a fishery regardless of who caught
them are pooled across all the members. Second, the stock externality can be
mitigated. Individual and thus aggregate fishing effort under revenue sharing is less
than when in open-access fisheries because the marginal cost per unit of effort under
revenue sharing is N (= the number of members) times greater than an open-access
fishery. Third, the crowding or spatial externality can be internalized to some degree
because the productivity of fishing as a group is relevant under revenue sharing, not an
individual performance. A revenue sharing harvester exerts his effort in such a way to
maximize the marginal productivity of all the members because an individual
harvester can maximize his profits by increasing group productivity given the number
of harvesters. The same logic applies to temporal externality, in which different prices
are expected depending on the timing of landing. What is important for a revenue
sharing harvester is collective performance, whether temporal or spatial.
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2.3 Japanese surf clam fishing in Hokkaido Prefecture
Any entities that conduct commercial fishing in Japan’s coastal waters must belong to
a local Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA). These FCAs not only enforce national
and prefectural regulations but also self-regulate the resources tailored to local
conditions. Within an FCA many groups of fishers are formed mainly based on the
species they target and/or the fishing gear they use. Each group has their own rules of
regulation and management and can decide whether to share revenue. No member can
fish independently; every member must operate as a member of the group.
Fishers in Japan do not employ revenue sharing arrangement as insurance
against risk of income fluctuations; most of the FCAs in Japan provide their members
formal insurance partly subsidized by the national government, which assures no
reason for any fishers in Japan to pool revenue as a risk hedge. Platteau and Seki
(2001) presented anecdotal evidence for this argument based on the interview
conducted with fishermen under revenue sharing arrangement.
Based on the data provided by Uchida and Wilen (2007), many of the revenuesharing groups are concentrated in the northeastern Japan, target sedentary species,
and use small-scale trawl or gillnets. The coastal fisheries in southern Japan are
characterized with fishing many species with the same fishing technology, which
complicates the process to share revenue. Many sedentary species fisheries are
required to employ small-scale trawl and gillnets by regulation, which results in
relatively smaller heterogeneity in fishing skills and outcomes compared to other
migratory species or other fishing technology such as fishing bonito. According to
Fishery Census of Japan, the fishing groups that share revenue accounted for 11
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percent of all groups in 1988 and the percentage increased to 17 percent until 1998
until consistent data are available. 1
There are several reasons for choosing Japanese/Sakhalin surf clam
(Pseudocardium sachalinensis) fishery, known as Hokkigai in Hokkaido Prefecture,
for this study. A sufficient number of groups engage in this fishery in the same
Hokkaido Prefecture. These groups have adequate variation in with or without revenue
sharing while relatively homogeneous in other operational rules including engagement
of the collective efforts. Focusing on a particular region and carefully selecting groups
based on the preliminary data, but without consulting the outcomes, enables us to
control many observed and possibly unobserved characteristics at the time of
sampling.
Harvesting technology is one factor controlled at the time of sampling. Both
simple and advanced technologies are found in Hokkaido: dredges, jet dredges,
spearfishing, 2 and digging. Jet dredges are by far the most common and the most
advanced technology for harvesting the surf clams. This technology was introduced to
some FCAs as early as in 1970s in Hokkaido and has gradually spread all over
Hokkaido. It is known to mitigate the damages to shells. Employment of this
technology is often accompanied by a great reduction in the number of active boats
because of its high initial costs.
The Hokkaido government requires their FCAs using the jet dredges to impose
a minimum catch size of 7.5 cm and closure of fisheries for certain months during the
1

In 2003 the ratio of revenue sharing among all groups dropped to 12 percent partly because the
definition of fishing groups was changed. In later censuses no comparable information has been
provided.
2
There are five fishery groups in Hokkaido that spearfish the clams as of 2013. Spearfishing the clams
involves spears with craws at the tip to pick up the clams.
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spawning season. In addition, many FCAs in Hokkaido self-impose voluntary Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) restriction, 3 landing volume control, and stock enhancement.
Individual skippers are required to cooperate for self-regulation including the
collective efforts for stock enhancement.
The way the FCAs in Hokkaido organize their shellfish fishery is practically
identical. It involves (1) stock assessment conducted by the staff members at Fisheries
Extension Offices located all over coastal Hokkaido in collaboration with local
skippers and FCAs, either prior to or after every fishing season; (2) all skippers are
called to gather for a pre-season meeting to hear the results of the stock assessment
from the local Fisheries Extension Office, to decide a seasonal TAC, and to review
operational rules and policy for the season; and (3) during the season a leader and subleaders closely watch the market prices (mostly by directly talking with the
middlemen) and decide whether to go fishing on the day and if so how much to land
subject to the seasonal TAC. Each group usually has an elected leader and multiple
sub-leaders for the groups of a significant size. 4 Finally, (4) during and/or after the
season whether they share revenue or not all skippers in all FCAs are required to
contribute to the collective efforts to make the fishery favorable for growth of the
Japanese surf clams although how much to contribute can vary across the FCAs.
These efforts include cultivating ocean beds, removing predators, and transplanting

3

As far as fishermen and FCAs can remember the Japanese surf clam fishery has been enforcing selfimposed TAC, which can range from a few to 20 percent of total estimated stock. According to personal
communication with Professor Izumi Sakurai who was a former scientist at Hokkaido Central Fisheries
Experimental Station recommended ten percent of a TAC as it was a natural increase of the Japanese
surf clams (Sakurai, 2014).
4
Individual skippers can decide whether or not to fish on the day the leader decides to go fishing, but
they cannot go fishing when the leader decides not to go. On the other hand, when a group shares
revenue, skippers must follow a leader’s decision; all skippers fish or do not fish altogether.
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clams. 5 Many FCAs also buy juvenile clams from the other fishery groups and release
them in their waters.
The surf clam prices do not fluctuate as other migratory species and leaders in
any fishery groups have a very good understanding of how much to harvest to
maintain the prices. Regardless of the management systems the groups set daily
volume restriction in addition to a seasonal TAC. In some groups without revenue
sharing arrangement the daily volume restriction can be pre-determined at the
beginning of the season, in which case a leader only decides whether to open up the
fishery on that day. In all revenue sharing groups and the other non-revenue sharing
groups a leader decides how much to land on each fishing day, paying attention to the
market prices.
The prices not only depend on supply and demand, but also they can vary with
shell colors and sizes. The markets generally give higher prices per kilogram for larger
sizes. They also value black shells more than brown shells for their beauty although
they are an identical species and should taste the same. 6 Difference in colors results

5

It is believed in some fishermen and FCAs that it creates a better environment for the Japanese surf
clams to stir at the bottom of oceans. In fact it can make the ocean beds softer and thus easier for the
clams to dig and go deeper in the ocean ground, which turns their shells more black (Sakurai, 2014).
Yet, how successful this effort is in making the ocean beds softer depends on geographical conditions
and can be minimal in some places. Transplanting is a more direct way to improve growth of the surf
clams. High density of the clam population is one of the factors that can limit their growth (Sakurai,
2014).
6
In 2012, the FCA E in the Table 2.1 received the average premium of 22 percent for black shells. The
FCA E landed black shells and brown shells at different months. The months when black shells were
landed received on average lower prices at the overall market in Hokkaido. Thus, 22 percent premium
may not be true, and yet it can be confidently inferred that fishermen received at least considerable
premium on black shells in 2012. Interviews with fishermen in all FCAs reveal that fishermen are aware
of this premium.
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from the characteristics of habitats, muddy or sandy, and a choice of the habitats is
partly correlated with age. 7
This market structure of the clams makes the collective efforts for stock
enhancement even more important. Stock enhancement can take a form of directly
stocking seeds of clams purchased from other FCAs or transplanting younger clams to
be harvested in few years later within the same FCA. The purpose and effect of
transplanting can be multifaceted; it can simply save traveling time by transporting all
at once from distant fishing grounds to the ones closer to the port; it can increase
marginal productivity of a fishery by transplanting from densely populated patches to
less populated patches; and it can increase marginal revenue of a fishery by changing a
composition of black and brown shells. Different types of ocean grounds, specifically
whether sandy gravel or mud, create the two colors of the shells. In some FCAs, in
which the fishery is composed of different types of ocean grounds, transplanting the
clams from sandy sea floor to muddy one can increase value of the clams by turning
their shells black.
What fishermen can do to catch higher valued clams is to choose a fishing
ground with more abundance in larger, black-shelled clams. This can create a race to
fish for larger, black-shelled clams even when a daily quota in addition to a seasonal
one is imposed. The survey responses by fishermen reveal importance of location
choice in the surf clam fishery. The important information that fishermen most

7

Shell colors of the Japanese surf clams result from their natural habitats; muddy sediments turn their
shells black while sandy and gravel sediments keep them brown. The ocean grounds on the Pacific
Ocean side are muddier whereas the Sea of Japan side tend to have a characteristic of rocky, sandy
sediments (Sakurai, 2014). Difference in the market values by color is particularly important in the
sampled fishery groups because all of them are on the Pacific Ocean side.
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exchanged with the other fishermen during the 2012 season was about specific hotspots.
Well-managed groups can maintain higher prices per kilogram in the long run
by coordinating harvesting strategies in accordance to the transplanting effort.
Location choice in harvesting strategies becomes even more important when the
collective efforts for stock enhancement are in place. The cost of stock enhancement
needs to be incorporated in a fisher’s decision making in selecting a specific fishing
location in order to maximize social benefits as a group. For instance, harvesting the
clams before their shells turn black ruins the transplanting effort. Thus, harvesting in
coordination with the transplanting effort in addition to choosing a location with
highest marginal revenue is important.
While social capital can unite fishers and incline them for a group interest
without financially binding them, revenue sharing arrangement can provide a financial
incentive for collective fishing (Platteau & Seki, 2001). The fishers under revenue
sharing are financially motivated to coordinate effort allocation; the non-revenue
sharing fishers do not have such an incentive because their profits solely depend on
their own catch and the benefits of effort allocation may not accrue to all the fishers
equally. All fishers, regardless of management systems, depart from their ports at the
sunrise (regulation set by the government), but only revenue sharing fishers return to
the ports all together at the same time. Some revenue sharing fishers designate
themselves to specific fishing grounds prior to departure and communicate over the
radio on the sea about who catch how much in where, further adjusting effort
allocation on the sea.
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In addition, the degree of effort coordination and devotion to the collective
efforts can vary within revenue sharing groups and difference within the revenuesharing groups may be attributable to different levels of social capital. Some groups
may allocate the efforts roughly (e.g. designate areas for fishing) while others may
coordinate with a great precision (e.g. designate a boat to a specific fishing location),
which can make a difference in the outcomes even among the same revenue sharing
groups. Similarly, some revenue-sharing groups may devote more to the collective
efforts than other revenue-sharing groups. The more fishers contribute to the efforts
the greater the effect per unit of effort can be to the point where the effect of these
collective efforts exhibits increasing returns to scale. For example, transplanting a
negligible amount of the clams may fail to bring the density of the clams down to the
level desired for their growth although the ones transplanted can benefit.
How revenue sharing can affect the resource conditions can appear in deciding
a self-imposed TAC and how strictly a group enforces the TAC, which is voluntarily
set and not required by the bylaws to be a specific amount or in a specific range. All
sampled fishery groups in this study have been conducting stock assessment for the
entire sampling period. The results of the stock assessment have been used to assist the
FCAs and the fishermen to determine a seasonal TAC for the coming season.
Revenue sharing arrangement and social capital can also affect the resource
stock through the collective efforts. Directly stocking seeds of the clams can increase
the stock size; transplanting can enhance growth of the clams; removing predators can
help more clams to survive and live longer. The effects of all these collective efforts
can be closely related to an incentive under revenue sharing and the level of social
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capital as discussed above. The stock assessment reports also provide detailed
information on density and age composition of the clams for each fishing plot. This is
not the only source of information fishers can have (fishers know about the fishing
grounds from their fishing experience) but is certainly helpful to plan stock
enhancement and effort coordination.
Our hypotheses can be rephrased in the specific context of this Japanese surf
clam fishery in Hokkaido. The first hypothesis is that revenue sharing arrangement
improves ex-vessel prices as well as perceived income and conserves the resource
stock better through coordinating the fishing efforts and the collective efforts for the
stock enhancement more efficiently (Figure 2.1). The second hypothesis is that social
capital—cooperation, trust, and information network—improves the same outcomes
through uniting fishers without any economic incentives. These are the direct effects
of the two factors. The third hypothesis is that the interactions between revenue
sharing and social capital lead to better outcomes. The hypothesis can be divided into
three sub-hypotheses for each social capital element to be examined. The first subhypothesis is that revenue sharing fosters cooperation among fishers and the
cooperation augmented by revenue sharing further reinforces coordination in a fishery
and results in improvements in the outcomes. The second sub-hypothesis is that
general trusting attitudes in a community lead to revenue sharing, which further
assures coordination in fishing and better outcomes. The third sub-hypothesis is that
revenue sharing develops information sharing networks among fishers, which affects
efficiency of coordination in a fishery and improves the outcomes. The differences in
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the causal directions in the three sub-hypotheses will become more plausible when
exact definitions of each parameter are introduced below.

2.4 Methods

Sampled Groups
Parallel to pre-processing in large-N studies (Ho et al., 2007), carefully selecting cases
at the time of sampling is crucial in small-N studies so as to remove any relevant
factors that can take away the degree of freedom in regression (George & Bennett,
2005; King, Keohane, & Verba, 2001). Thus, sampled fishery groups were selected
based on the observed characteristics. The data from Uchida and Wilen (2007)
contained such information as of 2005 for 91 fishery groups in Japan, 53 of which
operated under revenue sharing arrangement. In addition, the data provided location of
a fishery, a year established, a type of fishing technology, a type of self-regulation,
and a type of collective fishing efforts.
The sample consists of ten fishery groups, five of which are under revenue
sharing and the other five are not and have never been under such arrangement. They
all engage in a small-scale trawl fishery, targeting the Japanese surf clams 8 and are
located in Hokkaido prefecture (eight of them are in Kushiro/Nemuro region, eastern
Hokkaido), which means facing the same market, biological conditions, and historical
backgrounds. All the groups self-manage the resources of the Japanese surf clams as
8

Fishers can incidentally catch other shellfish species such as Northern great tellins (Megangulus
venulosus) and sunray surf clams (Mactra chinensis). Although in some FCAs the value of these
bycatch shellfish can weigh more than the Japanese surf clams, importance of those bycatch species in
the fishery groups in this study is not greater than 30 percent of all the landings, and it is safe to say that
fishers in this study target the Japanese surf clams.
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detailed above. The groups are only different in a decision to employ revenue sharing
arrangement accompanied by collective fishing operation in major characteristics and
management/operational rules, but the degree of self-regulation can also differ across
the FCAs (Table 2.1).
The sampling distribution of the ten groups can approximate the population
distribution of small-scale trawl fisheries targeting the Japanese surf clams. First, the
Hokkaido prefecture accounts for 76 percent of the Japanese surf clam landings in
Japan, making it by far the biggest producer as of 2006. 9 Second, the sampled ten surf
clam groups are a typical surf clam fishery in Hokkaido. As of 2011, 70 percent of the
surf clam groups in Hokkaido employ jet dredges, which are the technology all the
sampled fishery groups have been using for many years. 10 Among them the sampled
groups account for about 30 percent of total catch volume and value in Hokkaido. The
average value of all the surf clam fishery groups using the jet dredges was 37.39
million yen in 2011 while the average value of the sampled groups was 58.40 million
yen. These two distributions are statistically significantly different (Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon test). However, after excluding the groups that were worth less than 10
million yen the sampling distribution is not statistically different at a conventional
level from the population distribution in terms of catch value, catch volume, and the
number of skippers (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). Thus, the results from analyzing

9

Since 2007 the fishery census has only reported combined value of the Japanese surf clams with other
shellfish.
10
According to the data collected by Hokkaido Fisheries Extension Offices, 54 out of 77 groups
employed the jet dredges as of 2011. After excluding the biggest producer, Tomakomai FCA, the
sampled fishery groups produce 40 percent of the surf clams by value and volume. We intentionally
avoid including the Tomakomai FCA in the sample because, in addition to being the biggest producer,
the Tomakomai city also promotes the surf clams as a symbol of the city and the surf clams from the
FCA seems to have some branding power at the market, which is not the effect we intend to capture in
this study.
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the sampled groups can be inferred to the other surf clam fishery groups that have
some importance in value.

Data
We collected this unique dataset containing group information from the ten fishery
groups in a panel format from 1990 to 2012 and individual information on 79 skippers
belonging to the ten groups in a cross-sectional format. Our outcome variables are
measured at a group level as well as an individual level. For the group outcome
variables our data are in a panel format, and we regress the outcomes on group
management decisions and group social capital parameters. For the individual
outcome variables our data are in a cross-sectional format, and we regress the
outcomes on group management decisions and individual social capital parameters. In
what follows we describe construction of four outcome variables—two at a group
level and two at an individual level—followed by social capital parameters.
We approximate the group economic outcome in a fishery with yearly average
ex-vessel prices per kilogram with shell-on. 11 Thus, fishermen’s profit maximization
is approximated as revenue maximization by catching higher valued clams. Catch
volume is not a good indicator of management in this fishery because all the groups
self-impose a TAC in consideration for their resource conditions. The other important
aspect of fishery management is the biological outcome in a fishery, which is
approximated with resource stock density measured as volume in grams per squared
meters of fishing grounds.

11

The prices in this study are the average prices of the group, that is, yearly total value divided by
yearly total landings.
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In addition to these numerical measures for the group outcomes, fishers’
subjective perceptions towards management outcomes will be used to further
understand the effects of management systems. These individual outcome variables
are constructed from the survey responses; one question deals with an environmental
outcome of fishery management while the other question addresses economic
performance of fishery management. Specifically these questions are “Resource
management in your FCA is successful in increasing and/or maintaining shellfish
resources” and “Fishery management in your FCA is successful in increasing and/or
maintaining profits from shellfish fishing” respectively. The fishermen responded on a
five-point Likert scale from 1: strongly disagree to 5: strongly agree. Summary
statistics of the responses to the two questions are presented in Table 2.2.
The variables for perceptions towards the outcomes and social capital were
collected by the survey and the experiment with individual skippers. The social capital
parameters are cross-sectional data measured in either 2013 or 2014, and are
aggregated to the group level and assumed to be constant over time when they are
regressed on the ex-vessel prices and resource stock density in a panel format, which
were collected at a group level along with other fishing operation data. The prices and
stock information are time-series cross-sectional data from 1990 to 2012 with some
random missing observations in early years, except for two observations of one group
that voluntarily closed the fishery for two years because of concern for the resource.
Table 2.3 shows summary statistics of the two group outcome variables.
Two of the five revenue sharing groups switched from non-revenue sharing to
revenue sharing during the period of the panel analysis. All other groups have been
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under the same management systems. In addition, all the groups have been performing
other relevant fishing practices such as stock assessment, a TAC, and
transplanting/stocking for the entire period.
Controlled economic experiments with fishermen subjects were conducted
from fall 2013 to spring 2014. Participants also completed a survey for demographics
and answered questions on perceptions towards management outcomes, trusting
attitudes, and information network among fishermen such as the number of other
fishermen they exchange information with. Table 2.4 shows summary statistics of
participants. One to 16 skippers, ranging from 15 to 100 percent of all member
skippers, participated in a session. An average skipper in the sample has been in the
surf clam fishery for 24 years as far as the panel analysis covers.
In addition, demographic difference between revenue sharing groups and nonrevenue sharing groups is significant in age and household size (both p value < 0.05,
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). Revenue sharing skippers in the sample are
significantly younger and have a greater household than those who do not share
revenue. But we did not find a significant difference in shellfish fishing experience,
possibly one of the most important factors that can affect social capital.

Cooperation parameters
Although social capital involves various attributes, the focus in this study is on
cooperation measured by controlled economic experiments and trust and information
network measured by the survey. The parameters for cooperation are estimated from
the observations of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). The indices for

73

trust and information network are constructed from the survey responses. They are
then aggregated into group variables as mean and standard deviation of group
members, which are used in main regression to measure their effects on the outcomes.
To measure cooperation among fishermen the standard, repeated VCM was
conducted (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Carpenter, 2002). Participants were recruited
through the FCAs, and many of them held some executive positions in the fishery
groups at the time of recruitment. A flyer was provided with the FCAs to make
general calls for the experiments and the surveys, and the flyer indicated that the
volunteers would be asked to participate in economic experiment (play a simple game)
in addition to a survey on fishing operation and they would be paid in cash fixed
participation fees plus the earnings from the experiment.
Before the experiment begins participants were randomly divided into groups
of four persons that were sustained for an entire session. The participants were not told
whom they were playing with. 12 The participants were given 3,000 yen (roughly
US$30) worth of coins as an endowment every round and asked how much to
contribute to a public good from his endowment. Once all the participants made their
decision the total contribution of each group was calculated, doubled by the
experimenter, and then distributed equally among the group members. The amount not
contributed to a public good was kept to each participant. The participants earn a sum
of the dividends from a public good, regardless of their own contribution to a public
good, and the money kept to themselves for a round. The dominant strategy in the
game is to contribute nothing because marginal return from a public good is smaller
12

In case that the number of participants was not multiple of four, which happened at most sessions, the
contribution amounts of some participants were counted twice in multiple groups to avoid the effect of
varying group size as in Carpenter and Williams (2010).
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than the one from a private account regardless of total group contribution. The game
was repeated ten times with the exception of one session. 13 At the end of the
experiment two of the ten rounds were randomly drawn as a binding round, and the
participants were paid the average of the payoffs from the two rounds plus a
participation fee of 3,000 yen. 14
A total of 80 subjects participated in the experiment; two subjects were
excluded from the analysis. 15 All the sessions took place at a conference room at the
FCA or at the community center nearby. The participants were seated facing the wall,
and in between the participants portable blinds were constructed (Figure 2.2). At the
beginning of every round the participants were given three boxes in different colors. In
a yellow box were 3000 yen worth of coins—real money—as an endowment, a red
box was intended for a private account, and a green box was for public good
contribution. The participants were asked to move all the coins from the yellow box to
either the red box (to keep) or the green box (to contribute), which made it difficult to
guess what other participants were doing based on the amount of the noise made from
13

The last five rounds were conducted with social disapproval treatment introduced by Carpenter and
Seki (2011). However, in this study we do not consider the parameters obtained by this treatment
although the observations during these rounds are used for estimation. The session at one FCA repeated
the standard VCM for six times with another version of social disapproval for the last two rounds.
14
A participation fee was set high in this experiment to mitigate concern expressed by many FCA staffs
for performance-based payment. The session accommodated two more games for different research and
thus lasted in total between 2.5 hours and 3 hours. The VCM lasted less than 1.5 hours and the average
earning from this game was 4,700 yen.
15
One subject was a FCA staff and did not face the same incentive as other subjects. He did not expect
to receive any compensation during the experiment and planned to surrender it to his supervisor. He
was needed in the session because only four fishers showed up, which would identify exactly whom
they were playing the game with. Difference in the degree of anonymity potentially alters the incentives
because the participants know each other. The other subject was an elderly skipper who contributed all
of his endowment throughout the session. At the end of the session he gave his earnings to his grandson
who worked at the FCA. It is apparent that he did not take a series of decisions seriously. The average
contribution made by the other three members in the group with the FCA staff was smaller than the rest
of the participants and the average contribution in the group with the elderly skipper was greater, and
these two groups (excluding the FCA staff and the skipper) are significantly different from the rest of
the participants at p value < 0.01 respectively.
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moving coins. Once the decision was made the experimenters collected all the boxes
and calculated the total contribution of each group and the dividends from a public
good. These results were written down on a sheet of paper and distributed to the
participants with the three boxes and the coins for the next round.
The mean contribution of all participants is 1,635 yen (55% of endowment)
with individual contribution ranging from zero to 3,000 yen (0-100% of endowment).
Revenue sharing fishers on average contributed 1,600 yen (53%) to a public good,
compared with the average non-revenue sharing fisher contributing 1,762 yen (59%).
The difference is statistically significant at p value = 0.004 (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
test). For comparison the same experiment by Carpenter and Seki (2011) with
fisherman subjects yielded the overall average contribution of 49% (N = 27) with
revenue sharing fishers contributing 51% and non-revenue sharing fishers contributing
46%. This suggests that the fishermen in our study contributed slightly more overall
regardless of management systems and the difference in contribution between revenue
sharing fishers and non-revenue sharing fishers went in the opposite direction.
However, this does not necessarily imply that revenue sharing fishers in this study
cooperate less because they are statistically significantly younger than non-revenue
sharing fishers, which is a very important demographic characteristic that can affect
how much to contribute (Aswani, Gurney, Mulville, Matera, & Gurven, 2013). In fact,
significant difference between the two groups disappears after controlling for age. 16
The OLS without controlling for age (Contributeijt = 𝛼 + Rev.Sharingj + eijt; Adjusted R2 for the
model is 0.009) implies that revenue sharing skippers contribute on average 202 yen less than the
average non-revenue sharing skipper at p value=0.006 while the OLS controlling for age (Contributeijt =
𝛼 + Rev.Sharingj + agei + eijt; Adjusted R2 for the model is 0.040) does not find significant difference
between the two groups (p value=0.204). Multilevel modeling incorporating random effects of
individuals nested within sessions also yields similar results; revenue sharing is not a significant factor
(p value=0.431) when age is controlled for (Wald statistics for the model is 6.73).
16
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The observed amount contributed to a public good, y, is censored between zero
and 3,000 and is related to a latent variable, y*, as follows.

𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �

∗
if 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
≤0
∗
∗
𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 if 0 < 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
< 3000.
∗
3000 if 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 3000

0

The amount contributed to a public good, y, is regressed on a sum of contribution
made by other members in the previous round, 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) . The model needs to allow

individual variation for this coefficient for the reason to be apparent later and thus
accommodates a random parameter for 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) . In addition, it is likely to be

correlated within the same subject nested within the same session and thus the two
random effects for subjects and for sessions are also estimated.
We estimated this model using Generalized Latent Variable Model (Skrondal
& Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). This model is very flexible that it estimates multi-level

random effects as well as one random parameter while allowing the Tobit
specification simultaneously. The model is estimated with the following specification.
3
∗
2
|𝑿, 𝒖�� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) ,
Γ�𝐸�𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖

where 𝛽𝟎 and 𝛽1 are parameters to be estimated, 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) is a vector of a sum of

1
contribution made by other members in the previous round, 𝑢𝑗1 and 𝑢𝑖𝑖
are random

3
effects for sessions and subjects, 𝑢𝑖𝑖
is a random parameter, Γ(∙) is a link function (the
∗
identity or the probit function), and 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
is distributed as Gaussian or Bernoulli. We

assume

3
∗
2
𝐸�𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
|𝒖� = Γ −1 �𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) �.
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Table 2.5 shows estimation results of the model. An average participant
contributes 1,272 yen and an individual variation is in a range of 998 yen standard
deviation, which is both economically and statistically significant. An average
participant contributes 0.06 yen (the average marginal effect on the observed
distribution) more to a public good after observing a marginal increase in the
contribution by the other members, which is statistically significant but not
economically significant. This varies across individuals in a 0.08 yen standard
deviation at a statistically insignificant level.
The results suggest that the participants care about what the others’
contribution is and do respond to it cooperatively. The positive coefficient for 𝛽1

implies that they do not shirk and cooperate more when the others cooperate more.
However, a dominant part of their strategies is their own contribution level determined
outside of what the others did in the previous round. The participants are a group of
people who interact daily or at least regularly in a fishery regardless of management
systems. It is possible that they decide their contribution based on the relationship they
have in a daily life rather than on what the other participants did in this experiment.
2
This is captured in 𝛽0 and its variation across individuals as 𝑢𝑖𝑖
.

The two parameters for cooperation are created: conditional cooperation and

unconditional cooperation (Carpenter & Williams, 2010; Carpenter & Seki, 2011).
3
The conditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢𝑖𝑖
and measures how

cooperative a person is in response to observed cooperativeness of the other members.
A greater value of this parameter indicates that a person is willing to cooperate more
after knowing the others’ cooperation than an average subject in the sample. The
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2
unconditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢𝑖𝑖
and measures general

cooperativeness of a person after taking into account conditional cooperation. The
greater the value of this parameter, the more cooperative a person is independently
from what the others are doing. Table 2.6 shows summary statistics of the two

parameters, which are normally distributed by assumption.

Information network indices
Based on the work by Holland et al. (2010) and Holland et al. (2013) we constructed
the measures of information network a skipper has in the shellfish fishery (Table 2.7).
The size of information network is constructed by the survey responses to the question
asking the number of shellfish fishermen with whom to share important information
that potentially affected own profits from shellfish fishing during the fishing season in
2012. An average skipper in these fishery groups shared such information with ten
skippers. Normalizing the size by the possible number of relationships (the size of a
fishery group) yields density of information network. An average density was about 30
percent, ranging from 0 to 100 percent. This indicates, for example, in the case of the
fishery group comprised of ten fishermen an average fisherman would have shared
important information with three other fishermen.
After listing five names of fishermen with whom a person has most important
relationships subjects were asked what kinds of information he shared with each of the
relationships. 17 Based on the information provided by FCA staffs six kinds of
information were identified as relevant to the surf clam fishery: market, buyer
17

Some skippers refused to provide the names of other skippers because they feel that they would leak
personal information of others, which resulted in a lower response rate for the subsequent questions on
varieties of information and frequency of sharing the information than the other questions.
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information, specific hot-spots, market for bycatch and its hot-spots, high gear density
areas, and boat and gear. Taking the average of the number of kinds of information a
person shared with the listed relationships produces an index for varieties of
information. An average skipper shared about two types of information. Among the
six kinds the information on specific hot-spots was shared most (61% of the
relationships), followed by market information (56%). This suggests that decisions of
where to fish are one of the most important drivers in a successful catch in these
fisheries. As discussed in section 2, these survey responses reemphasize the
importance of knowing a change in the markets as the market information is placed as
the second type of information mostly shared. Information on boat and gear is also
important (37%) in these fisheries as reflected by the rule of many FCAs that more
than one skipper 18 are required to fish in one boat. These fishermen regard other
fishermen as being close friends (49%) and having common in boat and gear (33%).
Frequency of sharing the six types of information listed above during a 2012
season was asked for each relationship in a scale of one to seven: 1 as frequent as
everyday, 2 as every few days, 3 as once per week, 4 as once every two weeks, 5 as
once per month, 6 as every two months, 7 as once during the season. An average
skipper shared the important information with other skippers at least once a week
during the season. To avoid confusion, the reverse coded index will be used for main
estimation for frequency.

Trust indices
18

A term ‘skipper’ used in this study means a fisher who is independent and not hired for a fixed
remuneration by a captain. Therefore a skipper may jointly own a boat or pay a fixed charter fees to an
owner.
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Trusting attitudes of skippers were measured based on the literature (Glaeser, Laibson,
Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). The two questions from General Social Survey
(GSS) 19 were adopted and asked how strongly a person agrees or disagrees with the
following statements: 1. These days you can't count on strangers, and 2. In dealing
with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that
they are trustworthy. Subjects responded on a five-point Likert scale from 1: strongly
disagree to 5: strongly agree. Summary statistics of the two trusting measures are
presented in Table 2.8. To avoid confusion, the reverse coded index will be used for
main estimation.
Measuring trust using Trust game 20 is unsuitable in this study because the only
reliable parameter to be obtained by the trust game is trustworthiness, which was
found to be correlated with the GSS survey responses as shown by Glaeser et al.
(2000). Glaeser et al. (2000) compared different methods of measuing trust and found
that the responses to the questions from the GSS were correlated with trustworthiness
measured by the Trust game. This result suggests that general attitudinal questions can
measure some aspect of trust although what the questions actually capture is different
from what they were intended to capture. Adding two questions in the survey instead
of conducting even a one-shot Trust game greatly saves time needed for completion of
all the experiments including the surveys, which makes it easier for more fishermen to

19

General Social Survey is an established survey, a longest-running project by NORC at University of
Chicago, that has been asking an American population about demographic, behavioural, and attitudinal
questions since 1972. International Social Survey Program, established by the NORC, has been
conducting the same survey internationally and a Japanese version also exists.
20
In the trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) Investor has endowment of S and makes a transfer
y between 0 and S to Trustee. Trustee receives 3y and can send back any amount x between 0 and 3y to
Investor. Investor earns S – y + x. Trustee earns 3y – x. An amount sent back by Trustee, x, measures
positive reciprocity (Camerer & Fehr, 2004), which is referred as trustworthiness in Glaeser et al.
(2000).
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cooperate for the experiment. Furthurmore, trusting behaviours measured by the Trust
game were shown to be a poor indicator of trust and more correlated with risk attitudes
(Karlan, 2005).

Empirical estimation
A careful sampling of groups based on observed characteristics has already helped us
to construct a sample of revenue sharing fishery groups and the groups with similar
traits but without revenue sharing.
Relative importance of the incomes from the Japanese surf clam fisheries may
affect a decision to pool revenue and the outcomes and therefore may cause
endogeneity. When the surf clams are not a primary source of income, a fisher may
disregard the situation of the fishery or how to manage and fish the resources. We
approximate importance of the surf clam fishery as shellfish shares in each FCA (total
shellfish value/FCA value). The greater the shellfish share of a FCA is, the more likely
not only the group member fishers but also the FCA managers may be to take the
management seriously. The surf clam fishery in revenue sharing FCAs accounts for on
average 2.8 percent of all species, ranging from 0.6 to 6.2 percent while in nonrevenue sharing FCAs the surf clams value on average 1.9 percent with the minimum
share of 0.9 and the maximum of 3.1 (Table 1.1). A nonparametric test with the
alternative hypothesis (𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑟𝑟𝑟 > 𝜃𝑟𝑟𝑟 ) shows that these two groups are not

significantly different at p value = 0.65 in terms of the shellfish share (Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon test, distribution adjusted for small sample inference).
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The absolute value of the FCAs, which each fishery group belongs to, may be
important. The greater the FCA, the more resources may be available to the groups.
The FCAs to which revenue sharing groups belong value on average 2,636 million yen
as of 2012, compared with 2,884 million yen of non-revenue sharing FCAs (Table
1.1), although the difference is not statistically significant (p value = 0.65, MannWhitney-Wilcoxon test with Ha: 𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑟𝑟𝑟 > 𝜃𝑟𝑟𝑟 , adjusted for small sample
inference).

Many surf clam skippers engage in other fisheries when the surf clam fishery is
closed and the income from the surf clams is not the largest contributor for many
skippers. Konbu seaweed or kelp is a big fishing industry in eastern Hokkaido, where
most sampled fishery groups are located and most of the surf clam skippers, six (three
in revenue sharing) of the ten fishery groups, engage in kelp fisheries (Table 1.1). The
other fisheries the other groups engage in are salmon, shishamo, and gillnets targeting
groundfish. No revenue sharing shellfish skipper has revenue sharing arrangement in
the other fisheries.
Length of the surf clam fishing seasons can influence a decision to share
revenue and the outcomes. In fact, an average revenue sharing group fished for a
significantly shorter season from 1990 to 2012 (p value < 0.001, Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon test). While longer fishing seasons can make it difficult for fishermen to
coordinate and fish together as a group, they may have more flexibility to time the
landings of the surf clams, which can affect the prices. On the other hand, revenue
sharing arrangement may make it harder for the group to extend the fishing season,
which can be more attributable to the size of the group.
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In addition to the factors controlled at the time of sampling such as location,
targeting species, and fishing technology, these observations lead us to believe that
there is no significant or systematic difference in assignment of the treated groups
(revenue sharing) based on observed characteristics that can affect the outcome and a
decision to employ revenue sharing except for the season length.
OLS estimators are not appropriate as identification strategy; first,
heterogeneity discussed above and endogeneity between the variables of interests and
the outcomes can bias the OLS estimates; second, the small sample problem of ten
groups can understate the standard deviation of the estimators. To address a part of the
problems random-effects model with clustered standard errors is used for estimation.
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑿′𝑖𝑖 𝛽 + 𝒁′𝑖𝑖 𝛾 + 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖 ,

where i indexes groups and t years. Each group i contains 𝑇𝑖 observations, which sum

to N. 𝑦𝑖𝑖 is an outcome of interest, either the prices per kilogram or the resource stock
density in grams. X contains the variables of interest, a rarely changing revenue

sharing indicator and time-invariant social capital parameters. The two variables of
interest can be put together in the same model if the assumption that there is no causal
relationship between the two is appropriate. Nonetheless the two will be put together
in one model to examine the indirect effects of the two as similarly used in Maccini
and Yang (2009). Z contains control variables that are different for each outcome. 𝑢𝑖

is the random, time-invariant heterogeneity specific to the ith group and 𝛼 is the mean

of 𝑢𝑖 . The panel structure of the sample is important because focus is on the average

change in the outcome not on the absolute value of the outcome in some year. When
the outcome variable is one of the subjective measures from the survey responses, the
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data become cross-sectional with no subscript t. For this estimation we use the OLS
estimator with clustered standard errors, as there is no benefit of using the GLS.
Control variables in the model for the prices include log of the number of
months during a fishing season, the landings in kilograms in the other surf clam
fisheries in Hokkaido, log of time trend, and a binary variable if the fishery has not
switched to jet dredges. 21 Control variables in the model for the resource stock are log
of time trend and a binary variable for the FCAs I and J for the years before the area of
the fishery changed due to port construction. 22 Control variables with the subjective
measures as a dependent variable include log of the number of years in shellfish
fishing and log of the number of months of the fishing season in 2012.
One drawback of relying on the random-effects model instead of the fixedeffects model is that the model imposes a stronger assumption on the data at hand. 23
The GLS estimator is most appropriate when the unobserved heterogeneity is
distributed normally (𝑢𝑖 ~𝑁(𝛼, 𝜎𝑢2 )) and is uncorrelated with other explanatory

variables (𝐸[𝑢𝑖 |𝑿) = 0). While the fixed-effects model is not feasible to estimate the

coefficients for the time-invariant variables of interest in this study, it can be justified

to choose the random-effects model over the fixed-effects model conditioned that

21

Most fishery groups have been using jet dredges during the entire sampling period except for the
FCA H, which started to use them in 1995.
22
The FCAs I and J share the same fishing grounds and act as one in a number of decisions especially
in terms of how to use the fishing grounds (a decision to go fishing, season length and more) and how to
sustain the resources (catch limit, stock assessment, a TAC and more).
23
Plümper & Troeger (2007) introduced an interesting estimator called fixed effects vector
decomposition, which enables estimating the coefficients of time-invariant variables the fixed-effects
model fails to estimate and further brings efficiency in estimation of the coefficients. Later Greene
(2011a; 2011b) provided formal analysis for this estimator along with Breusch et al. (2011) and for
efficiency Chatelain & Ralf (2010). To improve the model what is needed in this study is to relax the
strong assumption of the random-effects model. This new estimator only relaxes the assumption of
correlation between time-varying variables and the unobserved heterogeneity but not between timeinvariant variables and the heterogeneity, which is a concern in this study (Greene, 2011; Plümper &
Troeger, 2007).
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selection at the time of sampling and controls in a regression remove most if not all
observed heterogeneity that can capture unobserved heterogeneity. However, this
assumption is not testable, which can be scrutinized only qualitatively.
One could argue that the estimates suffer from endogeneity. While revenue
sharing and social capital parameters (cooperation, trust, information network) can
affect the prices and the stock, higher prices and stock abundance could influence the
decision to adopt revenue sharing and its stability, and the levels of cooperation, trust,
and information network. First, as regards to individual fisher’s decision to select into
a fishery group under revenue sharing Carpenter and Seki (2011) discussed that
selection bias for revenue sharing as an individual decision is not a significant problem
in Japanese fisheries because each fisher did not self-select into the system. While
individual decisions to adopt revenue sharing may not possess selection bias observed
in selecting into job training, adoption of revenue sharing arrangement is possibly
nonrandom. Preferences, value, and experience of individual fishers have been likely
to affect the group decision to adopt revenue sharing. Suenaga (2008) emphasized the
importance of involving fishers in the decision making process in Sandfish fishery in
Japan. All the fishers surveyed in the Japanese surf clam fishery who gave valid
response (64% of the respondents) suggested some involvement in the process for a
change in operational rules in the fishery.
Furthermore, there may exist a mechanism that can affect the outcomes while
being correlated with decisions to implement revenue sharing as well as the levels of
social capital. One possible scenario is a catastrophic event in the shellfish fishery
such as depletion of the resource due to overfishing, disease, weather, or all combined.
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First, we asked in the survey whether they have seen the shellfish resource depleted or
drastically decreased. After dropping 13 individuals who have been in the fishery for
less than 10 years, the percentage of the respondents who reported “yes” ranges from
50 to 100 with a mean of 71. Seventy-one percent of revenue sharing fishers answered
“yes” to the question while 72 percent of non-revenue sharing fishers did, which is not
a statistically significant difference (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.63,
Table 2.1). We also examined a more objective measure of resource stock density over
the last 20 years. The mean density of revenue sharing groups was 0.59 kilograms per
squared meter of a fishery and the mean density of non-revenue sharing groups was
0.54. We found these distributions between the two groups not statistically
significantly different (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.61). This can be
also supported by the fact that all the fishery groups, regardless of management
systems, have been self-imposing a TAC for the last 20 years at least. Examination of
these observations suggests that a possible catastrophic event like depletion of the
resource is less likely to be associated with implementation of revenue sharing
arrangement. However, a moderate variation across the groups is found on how many
members shares a sense of crisis on their resource conditions. Together with no
randomness of occurrence of revenue sharing arrangement, this calls for controlling
heterogeneity, observed or unobserved, in the fishery groups that are correlated with
implementation of revenue sharing arrangement as well as the levels of social capital.
Causal inference of the estimates crucially depends on how well unobserved
heterogeneity is controlled based on the above discussion. The sampled fishery groups
have been controlled on some important observables at the time of sampling; some
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relevant characteristics of the group operation will be controlled in a regression in
addition to time-invariant unobserved characteristics by exploiting a panel structure.
Unobservables consist of in part that is correlated with observables and in part that is
uncorrelated. The estimates are unbiased to the degree of how closely related the
observables are to the unobservables and thus how well these observables capture
unobserved heterogeneity.
Attention should be paid to another possible causal relationship that revenue
sharing arrangement may affect development of social capital and conversely social
capital induces employment of such arrangement. Specifically, revenue sharing
arrangement possibly encourages cooperation and information network due to
collective fishing operation accompanied by revenue sharing. On the other hand, trust
in a community can affect a decision to employ revenue sharing because of the way
the parameters are constructed specifically. When revenue sharing and social capital
are an outcome of each other or even partly, the coefficients of the two variables need
to be estimated separately (Angrist & Pischke, 2008); X must be a vector of only one
variable at a time. The estimated coefficient contains not only the effect of revenue
sharing but also the effect of social capital (trust) through revenue sharing when X is a
vector of the revenue sharing indicator. Similarly, the coefficient of social capital
estimated independently of revenue sharing includes a direct effect of social capital
plus an indirect effect of revenue sharing through interacting with greater social
capital (cooperation and information network). In addition, the two variables of
interest together in the same model tests specification of an indirect effect, that is the
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mechanism, through which revenue sharing and social capital interact each other and
enhance the synergy of each effect, as similarly used in Maccini and Yang (2009).
Concerns for standard errors still remain. The literature has been casting
doubts on inference based on cluster-robust standard errors when they are applied to
the data containing a few clusters and the invariant variables of interest within a
cluster (Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004; Donald &
Lang, 2007). Asymptotic justification of cluster-robust standard errors relies on the
assumption that the number of clusters goes to infinity. Clearly, the data with ten
clusters (groups) do not meet this assumption.
Although several solutions have been proposed, the wild cluster bootstrap
analyzed in Cameron et al. (2008) is the most appropriate in this study; the wild
cluster bootstrap can overcome the problems with having a few clusters and invariant
variables within a cluster. The wild cluster bootstrap is different from a standard
bootstrap method with cluster option commonly implemented by statistical software
such as Stata or SAS. The wild cluster bootstrap forms pseudo-samples based on the
residuals and uses “asymptotically pivotal” statistic. While the standard bootstrap
directly evaluates the distribution of the OLS estimates, the wild cluster bootstrap
forms the Wald statistics for every pseudo-sample and evaluates the distribution of
these Wald statistics, which is “asymptotically pivotal”. A statistic is said to be
asymptotically pivotal if its asymptotic distribution does not depend on any unknown
parameters. With a few clusters this feature is crucial.
Another method, bias-reduced linearization (BRL) originally proposed by Bell
and McCaffrey (2002) and applied by Angrist and Lavy (2009), can also achieve
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asymptotic refinement. However, it is not suitable with the data in this study as
underlying heteroskadasticity is expected to be severe due to the nature of unbalanced
panels. Monte Carlo simulations in Cameron et al. (2008) show that when there is
heteroskadsticity, BRL no longer improves inference whereas the wild cluster
bootstrap still does.
The wild cluster bootstrap also solves the issue with invariant or rarely
changing variables within a cluster. Forming pseudo-samples the wild cluster
bootstrap based on pairs of a dependent variable and explanatory variables has a good
chance of replicating the same pseudo-samples if explanatory variables do not vary
within a cluster. The wild cluster bootstrap can avoid this by sampling based on
residuals.
We extend the wild cluster bootstrap method detailed by Cameron et al. (2008)
to the GLS estimator 24 and will present bootstrapped p-value using the wild cluster
bootstrap-t method to guide us for better inference. Cameron et al. (2008) recommend
to use it with the null hypothesis imposed. Instead of using two-point distribution
originally applied by Cameron et al. (2008), Webb (2014) proposes to use six-point
distribution, which is recommended especially for the data with a very few clusters
less than ten clusters. This can greatly increase the number of possible values of the
estimated Wald statistics from pseudo-samples.

24

Cameron et al. (2008) note that this sampling method is applicable to any regression models with
additive error.
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2.5 Results
Although the overall direct effect of revenue sharing arrangement on either the
economic outcome or the biological outcome is not evident, the indirect effect of
revenue sharing affecting the perceived economic outcome through information
network seems to exist. This suggests that merely sharing revenue does not necessarily
result in a better economic outcome. However, revenue sharing arrangement can
augment denser information network, which then affects the economic outcome in
fisheries management. In addition, the overall effect of social capital on the outcomes
is mixed, and the results highlight important characteristics of a community that is
important to success in fisheries management. Tables 2.9 to 2.12 show selected results
for objective measures of the ex-vessel prices and the resource stock density. Tables
2.13 to 2.15 show selected results for subjective measures of the perceived outcomes.
Complete results are attached in Appendix.

Outcomes: prices and resource stocks
The results from estimation of cooperation suggest that unconditional cooperation
plays a more important role than conditional cooperation in the Japanese surf clam
fisheries. The groups with fishers who are more unconditionally cooperative are likely
to receive higher prices through greater contribution to the collective efforts. A
marginal increase in unconditional cooperation among fishers is expected to result in
43 yen higher prices while 21 yen higher prices are expected in conditional
cooperation (Column 6, Table 2.9). However, this results is not robust across different
specifications.
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In contrast to the effect on the economic outcome, unconditional cooperation
seems to negatively affect the biological outcome. The groups with fishers who are
more unconditionally cooperative are likely to result in a less stock density in the long
run. The marginal effect is 336 grams per m2, which is more than 50 percent of the
average stock density of 562 grams and thus significant in volume. However, after
correcting for the small sample inference this effect becomes no longer significant (pvalue = 0.11).
Estimation of the effects of trusting attitudes suggest that trust is more
important to the economic outcome than to the biological outcome. According to the
Table 2.10 the groups with fishers who are more trusting result in higher prices. A
marginal increase in trusting attitudes among fishers raises the surf clam prices by 40
yen. This effect remains significant even with the wild cluster bootstrap (p-value =
0.07).
Comparing Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.10, we did not find existence of the
indirect effect of fishers’ trusting attitudes on the outcome through encouraging
employment of revenue sharing arrangement. Value of the coefficient of trust is
unchanged (or slightly increased) after adding revenue sharing in regression. This
suggests that the direct effect of trust is the only effect and there is no indirect effect of
trust affecting revenue sharing.
The effect of information network is estimated in four aspects: information
size, network density, varieties of information shared, and frequency of sharing such
information. Among the four, the network size is suggested to have some influence on
the prices with some ambiguity and the network density is strongly suggested to have
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a great impact on the resource stock (Table 2.11). A marginal increase in network size
increases the average prices of the surf clams by 26 yen. With the small sample
correction implemented, however, the estimated coefficient is no longer significant at
a conventional level (p-value = 0.11).
Another important result from information network is that greater standard
deviation of the network density decreases the resource stock. This suggests that
cohesion of a group as having similar network density among the members improves
the resource stock density by 136 grams per m2 at the margin, which remains barely
significant with the wild cluster bootstrap (p-value = 0.10). Although the absolute
level of the network density becomes important when it is explaining the outcome
together with its standard deviation, the effect of cohesiveness of the information
network is greater than the overall level of information network. Again, the effect of
the network density seems to be a sole effect and does not include the indirect effect of
revenue sharing interacting with the network density. Whether sharing revenue or not
a cohesive network density in a fishery is important in improving the biological
outcome.
Among the significant effects identified, trusting attitudes affect the prices
most, which is robust in any specifications (Table 2.12). Different specifications in
estimation of the resource stock reveal some ambiguity on the standard deviation of
the network density.

Perceived outcomes
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The results suggest that a higher level of cooperation does not necessarily lead to
better perceptions of economic or biological outcomes; neither unconditional nor
conditional cooperation shows explanatory power for any outcomes (Table 2.13).
While trust seems to matter in the economic outcome, it doesn’t influence the
biological outcome (Table 2.14). Fishers with higher trusting attitudes are more likely
to feel that their income has been increasing or at least remaining at a certain level.
However, this estimated effect is no longer significant after being corrected for small
sample inference (p-value = 0.11).
Among the four aspects of information network, the varieties of information
shared and frequency of sharing such information seem to influence the management
outcomes. First, more varieties of information shared among fishers lead to a better
economic outcome, and this effect seems to be interacted with revenue sharing
(Columns 3 and 4, Table 2.14). The magnitude of the effect of varieties of information
shared decreases but with gain in significance for the effect of revenue sharing while
the explanatory power of the model increases. This suggests that fishers are more
likely to consider their profits as increasing or at least remaining at a certain level not
only when they share more varieties of information—direct effect of information
sharing—but also when they pool revenue and exchange more information—indirect
effect of revenue sharing through information sharing. These effects remain significant
even with small sample inference (all p value < 0.1). Frequency of sharing information
also increases fishers’ profits, but there seems to be no indirect effect of revenue
sharing. Among all the effects at work the frequency of sharing information has the
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most explanatory power although it loses statistical significance with small sample
inference (upper Column 7 of Table 2.14).
Although revenue sharing, cooperation, or trust seems to have no effect on the
perceived biological outcome, the only effect that is suspected to hold some influence
is the varieties of information shared. When fishers share more types of information,
they are more likely to feel that their resource stock conditions have been improving
or at least maintaining at a certain level. However, more information is not necessarily
related to more information on the stock and in fact this effect is no longer significant
after implementing small sample inference (p value = 0.13).
Breaking down what types of information being shared, we identified
information on specific hot-spots and high gear density areas is the types of
information that affects the economic outcome (Table 2.15). These two are not
severely correlated (correlation = 0.23). Revenue sharing arrangement encourages
both types of information in such a way that it improves the perceived economic
outcome. However, information on high gear density areas is suspected to have little
more explanatory power than specific hot-spots. The same estimation with the
biological outcome finds no significant effect on any types of information except in
buyer information, which confirms no reasonable association of the varieties of
information with the biological outcome.

2.6 Discussion
The results of the data analysis provide us insights into how management outcomes in
a fishery can be improved. The first lesson is that implementing revenue sharing
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arrangement does not necessarily generate synergies in harvesting efforts and other
collective efforts for the stock enhancement. Theoretically revenue sharing
arrangement can improve economic and biological outcomes in a fishery and in
particular the Japanese surf clam fisheries in Hokkaido can do so by generating
synergies because revenue sharing supports their group incentives. However, the data
and the results of the analysis did not support this prediction overall; no direct effect of
revenue sharing was found. Especially for the effect on the biological outcome it may
be suggested that a self-imposed TAC that has been already in place in all fishery
groups for many years suffices to ensure the health of the resource stocks. However,
this result does not necessarily suggest that revenue sharing arrangement should never
be employed; revenue sharing can achieve economic efficiency through other
mechanisms such as cost reduction.
Second, indirect effect of revenue sharing and social capital variables was
found in the varieties of information shared. Revenue sharing partly contributes to the
effect of the varieties of information; the fishers who share revenue are found to
exchange more varieties of information, which jointly contributes to the better
perceived economic outcome. This is particularly so in exchanging information on
specific hot-spots and high gear density areas. However, the effect of the varieties of
information is not robust in all specifications; it loses significance when the two
effects of the varieties of information and frequency of exchanging information are in
the same model. The effect of sharing information more frequently dominates the
effect of sharing more varieties of information, but the effect of frequency is not
associated with employment of revenue sharing in such a way to affect the perceived

96

outcomes. Although it is smaller than the effect of sharing information more
frequently, the effect of sharing more types of information can be enhanced by
revenue sharing arrangement meaningfully. This can be important policy implication
for the fisheries that suffer from inefficiency due to a lack of information sharing
among fishers.
Third, among the various aspects of social capital examined in this study the
following two lessons are noteworthy; fostering general trust in a community, not
necessarily directed towards fellow fishers, is key in economic success and
information sharing among fishers is critical in a fishery in both economic and
biological terms. The comprehensive analysis using different measures of
management outcomes demonstrates a consistent importance of information sharing
while different measures of the outcomes highlight different aspects of information
sharing (the network size matters for the prices, the network density for the resource
stock, the varieties of information and frequency for the perceived outcomes).
The results of the analysis of the prices as well as the perceived economic
success support importance of trust although the estimated effect with fishers’
perceptions was not consistently robust. This implies that trust in a community in
general can create good teamwork in a fishery group and enhance the effect of
collective efforts, which eventually yields better prices and increases income.
While the network size and the density have a positive impact on the outcomes
measured with the prices and the resource stock density, the varieties of information
shared and the frequency of exchanging such information affect the outcomes
measured as the perceptions of fishers. A positive effect of the information network
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implies that information is key in economic success of a fishery however it is
measured. As discussed earlier revenue sharing arrangement can strengthen some
aspects of the information network meaningfully to improve the perceived economic
outcomes. These results suggest that revenue sharing arrangement can be an effective
policy tool to reinforce the information network in a fishery, which generates
synergies in fishing operation and leads to better management outcomes.
Implementation of this arrangement may need to assure that free-riding is costly. In
the case of the Japanese surf clam fisheries in Hokkaido all the revenue sharing groups
have collective fishing operation, which makes it easy to monitor the efforts of other
members.
As fishers exchange information from more diverse fishers, on average as a
group they can fish better possibly because the information enables them to make a
better decision on where to fish and how to utilize the stock enhancement in
coordination with harvesting effort. The fact that the absolute size of network matters
more than the density also implies that more sources of information are more
beneficial regardless of how comprehensive a network is within a fishing group. This
can be true because a network that an individual member has needs not to be
comprehensive to spread information across the group. In fact, the most efficient
network should be structured in such a way that an individual needs to have a minimal
size of the network to spread information across the group. However, a caution needs
to be exercised to infer the estimated effect of the network size due to a moderate
linear correlation between the information size reported by the fishers and a possible
size of information network in their corresponding groups (correlation = 0.64).
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An interesting aspect of the effect of the network density on the stock is that
when some fishers in a group exchange information with more fishers than other
fishers in the same group do, it deteriorates the resource conditions. Thus, a group
with more cohesion in terms of how dense the information network is across its
members can achieve better resource conditions over time. More cohesion in terms of
the network density can imply more efficient structures of information networks. This
implies that with good organization of information network the fishery groups can
spread relevant information evenly across the group, which enables the group to more
successfully coordinate harvesting efforts or/and stock enhancement efforts as a group.
This feature seems to be more important for the health of the stock than the prices.
On average fishers in this sample shared two types of information during the
2012 season, and a type of information shared most involved specific hot-spots of the
clams (61% of the relationships 25), followed by market information. The result from
Table 2.14 suggests that, for example, the fishers who share three types of
information, boat and gear in addition to hot-spots and market, are more likely to
experience better outcomes in both economic and biological terms than the fishers
who share two types of information, hot-spots and market. Among the types of
information shared, specific hot-spots and high gear density areas are the information
that actually affected the economic outcome. These types of information that are
related to location choice in fishing can affect fishing outcomes more considerably
than buyer or market information in a sense that sharing buyer or market information
does not strategically alter the way fishers fish.

25

Multiple answers are allowed.
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The information was discussed on average once per week, and the fishers who
share such information more frequently are more likely to perceive a better economic
outcome. Thus, similar to the network size exchanging more types of information and
exchanging information more frequently can help fishers to fish more collectively and
thus efficiently.
While cooperation whether unconditional or conditional does not influence the
outcomes measured subjectively, estimation for the prices and the resource stocks
shows some influence of unconditional cooperation although the estimates are not
robust with small sample inference. It is especially puzzling that fishers with more
cooperative nature leads to deterioration in the stock conditions. Although this may be
the case through some unknown mechanism, the estimates may be suffering from
endogeneity. If the stock conditions have not been favorable historically, fishers may
have been working collectively over time, which could have resulted in more
cooperation measured in 2013. If this is the case, the estimate from the model is biased
and is not a true effect of cooperation on the resource stock. On the other hand, the
trust indices are less likely to suffer from endogeneity because the survey questions
relate to more general attitudes not necessarily directed towards other fishers.
The results from cooperation parameters also suggest that conditional
cooperation does not play any role in the outcomes of a fishery while some role of
unconditional cooperation is suspected. This may imply that the VCM did not elicit a
great difference in fishers’ responses to what others did in the game. Although fishers
did respond at a statistically significant level, the magnitude of response was
insignificant in an economic sense, and the model was not able to capture a significant
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individual variation in the response (Table 2.5). Thus, construction of conditional
cooperation relied on the variation estimated insignificantly while construction of
unconditional cooperation was based on the variation estimated significantly.
One final note to our results is that the results from ten fishery groups may
suffer from a small sample problem. Unless the outcomes are consistently,
significantly different in the two groups the model may not be able to capture a subtle
difference between the two if any with five groups in each. We provided asymptotic
refinement with the wild cluster bootstrap to increase confidence in our estimates, but
this does not necessarily minimize the variance. This leaves some room for future
study to refine the estimates with even a greater, better sample.
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FCA
A
B
C
108

D
E

Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of Sampled Fishery Groups
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Surf clam
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Shellfish Revenue Shellfish
value
FCA value Shellfish
Other
# of
fishing
sharing
group
(million
(million
share
fishery partici
started
started
size
yen)
yen)
(4) /(5)
*
pants
Pre1983-8
32
84.1
1,729
4%
Gillnet
7
1950
Pre1967
90
71.8
3,000
6%
17
Kelp
1956
Pre2002
24
26.6
5,016
2%
8
Kelp
1962
1976
1990
6
18.0
2,267
1%
6
Kelp
1964
1994
47
93.0
1,166
2%
8
Salmon

Treatment Groups Mean
F
G
H
I
J

Pre-1960
Pre-1949
1940
1931
1954-70
Control Groups Mean

(9)
Median
age
53

(10) Have
seen
resource
depleted
(%) **
57

52

78

53

71

49.5
51.5

60
88

40

59

2,636

3%

Kelp

9

52

71

75
10
73
6

95.2
27.2
69.7
41.6

3,080
4,136
4,572
1,327

3%
2%
2%
1%

Gillnet
Kelp

9
9
11
1

56
59
57
60

50
75
64

5
34

26.4
52

1,305
2,884

2%
2%

Kelp
Shisha
mo
Kelp
Kelp

100***
3
7

36
54

72

Note: As of 2012.
* The column (7) lists major fishery, in which many, if not all, shellfish fishermen in each group engage when the surf clam fisheries are closed. The
letters are bold if monetary value of the other fishery is greater than the surf clams. ** The column (10) lists the percentage of the respondents who
reported to have seen the resource depleted or drastically decreased after dropping the individuals who haven been in the fishery for less than ten
years. *** The FCAs I and J collectively manage the same resource stock.

Table 2.2 Summary statistics of perceptions towards the fishery
N
77

Mean
3.40

Std. Dev.
0.86

Perceptions towards resource
conditions
77
3.30
0.86
Perceptions towards economic
performance
Note: Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey.

Min
2

Max
5

1

5

Table 2.3 Summary statistics of the outcome variables
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Ex-vessel prices (yen per kg)
225 464.05
168.86
2
Stock density (grams per m )
193 562.35
374.38
Note: Ex-vessel prices are real prices (base year 2010).

Min
153.30
51.09

Max
858.30
1,633.40

Table 2.4 Summary Statistics of Participants
N
78
78

Mean
53.24
1.73

Std. Dev.
10.21
0.60

Min
26
1

Age
Education (1: Junior high school
- 6: Graduate degree)
Household size (persons)
77
2.77
1.72
0
73
23.93
13.87
1
Shellfish fishing experience
(years)
Note: Not all participants who participated in the experiment completed all the
questions in the survey.
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Max
79
4
6
55

Table 2.5 Estimating Cooperation Parameters
Dependent variable: Amount contributed by i in session j at round t
𝛽0: Constant

1,272.57***
(0.00)
𝛽1: Total group contribution excluding oneself in
0.08**
the previous round
(0.01)
45,915.791
Variance of 𝑢𝑗1 (Random intercept for sessions)
(0.58)
2
996,737.9**
Variance of 𝑢𝑖𝑖 (Random intercept for individuals)
(0.05)
3
0.007
Variance of 𝑢𝑖𝑖
(Random slope for individual 𝛽1)
(0.63)
Observations
666
Log-likelihood
-4,222.41
Notes: P-value in parentheses. Multilevel Tobit Regression.

Table 2.6 Summary Statistics of Cooperation Parameters
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Conditional cooperation
78
0.00
0.02
-0.05
0.08
Unconditional cooperation
78
0
844
-1,500
2,495
Note: Eighty subjects participated, two of whom were dropped from the analysis.

Table 2.7 Summary Statistics of Information Network Indices
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Network size (persons)
78
10.58
15.03
0
90
Network density (%)
78
31.08
34.50
0
100
Varieties of info (1-6 types)
60
2.05
1.27
1
5
Frequency (1: Everyday 63
2.71
1.93
1
7
7: Once in season)
Notes: Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey. The last two rows
have a particularly lower response rate because these questions are part of the section
that requires personal information.
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Table 2.8 Summary Statistics of Trust Indices
N Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Trust 1 (These days you can't count
78
3.06
0.67
1
4
on strangers)
Trust 2 (In dealing with strangers one 77
3.71
0.87
1
5
is better off to be cautious until they
have provided evidence that they are
trustworthy)
Notes: Subjects responded on a five-point scale from 1: strongly disagree to 5:
strongly agree. Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey.

111

Table 2.9 Estimated Effect of Cooperation on Price/Stock
Dependent Variable: Real price (yen per kg)
(1)
(2)
Revenue sharing
2.8
(0.88)
Conditional (mean)
9.3
(0.24)
Unconditional (mean)

(3)
2.2
(0.91)
9.4
(0.23)

(4)

35.7***
(0.00)
[0.15]
Yes
225
10
2597

(5)
17.3
(0.20)

36.5***
(0.00)
[0.14]
Yes
225
10
3035

(6)

20.8***
(0.00)
[0.05]
42.6***
(0.00)
[0.08]
Yes
225
10
13325

Control variables
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
225
225
225
Number of groups
10
10
10
Wald chi2
14333
14529
27665
Dependent Variable: Stock density (grams per m2)
(6)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Revenue sharing
38.6
38.8
31.9
(0.67)
(0.68)
(0.72)
Conditional (mean)
133.6
138.5
74.3
(0.24)
(0.25)
(0.38)
-335.6*** -336.0*** -316.2***
Unconditional (mean)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
[0.11]
[0.15]
[0.18]
Yes
Control variables
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
192
192
192
192
192
192
Number of groups
9
9
9
9
9
9
Wald chi2
509425 82098 137844 695139
683981
770148
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: GLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-value in
square brackets. All cooperation parameters are standardized. For the estimation of the
stock the FCAs I and J in the table 2.1 share their stock variable because they manage
and harvest in the same fishing grounds.
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Table 2.10 Estimated Effect of Trust on Price/Stock
Dependent Variable: Real price (yen per kg)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
14.5
21.6
Revenue sharing
(0.27)
(0.14)
40.1***
40.8***
26.8**
Trust (mean)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.05)
[0.07]
[0.07]
[0.64]
35.3***
38.3***
15.0
Trust (stdev)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.12)
[0.25]
[0.18]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Control variables
225
225
205
205
205
Observations
10
10
9
9
9
Number of groups
6201
6411
18714
4930
1997
Wald chi2
Dependent Variable: Stock density (grams per m2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
39.5
38.1
Revenue sharing
(0.66)
(0.67)
-153.6
-152.9
Trust (mean)
(0.13)
(0.16)
Trust (stdev)
-109.2
-104.7
(0.11)
(0.14)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Control variables
192
192
192
192
Observations
9
9
9
9
Number of groups
3.708e+0 1.020e+0 3.525e+0 6.820e+0
Wald chi2
6
7
6
6
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: GLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped pvalue in square brackets. All trust parameters are Trust 2 from the table 2.8 and
are standardized. The standard deviation from one FCA is missing in the upper
part because only one skipper participated from that FCA in the joint experiment
with another FCA. For the estimation of the stock the FCAs I and J in the table
2.1 share their stock variable because they manage and harvest in the same
fishing grounds.
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Table 2.11 Estimated Effect of Information Network on Price/Stock
Dependent Variable: Real price (yen per kg)
(1)
(2)
Revenue sharing
-5.8
(0.77)
Network size (mean)
25.8**
27.0*
(0.04)
(0.10)
[0.11]
[0.24]
Network size (stdev)
Control variables
Yes
Yes
Observations
225
225
Number of groups
10
10
Wald chi2
15856
39896
Dependent Variable: Stock density (grams per m2)
(1)
(2)
38.9
Revenue sharing
(0.67)
15.9
12.5
Network density (mean)
(0.88)
(0.91)
Network density (stdev)

Control variables
Observations
Number of groups

Yes
192
9

Yes
192
9
1.287e+
06

(3)

(4)
-3.5
(0.82)

(5)

22.5
(0.24)
20.0
(0.24)
Yes
205
9
24413
(3)

21.0
(0.23)
Yes
205
9
3901
(4)
43.2
(0.64)

-135.6** -142.1**
(0.04)
(0.04)
[0.10]
[0.09]
Yes
Yes
192
192
9
9

2.8
(0.90)
Yes
205
9
49744
(5)

259.1***
(0.00)
[0.06]
-309.5***
(0.00)
[0.03]
Yes
192
9

938026
510392
528358 1.871e+06
Wald chi2
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: GLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped pvalue in square brackets. All information network parameters are standardized. The
standard deviation from one FCA is missing in the upper part because only one
skipper participated from that FCA in the joint experiment with another FCA. For
the estimation of the stock the FCAs I and J in the table 2.1 share their stock
variable because they manage and harvest in the same fishing grounds.

114

Table 2.12 Estimated Effect of Social Capital on Price/Stock
(1)
(2)
(3)
Dependent Variable:
Real price (yen per kg)
Unconditional
11.9
33.8***
(mean)
(0.37)
(0.00)
[0.02]
Trust (mean)
31.8**
38.7***
(0.02)
(0.00)
[0.04]
[0.10]
23.8***
1.9
Network size
(mean)
(0.00)
(0.87)
[0.03]
Network density
(stdev)

(4)
(5)
(6)
Stock density (grams per m2)
-390.5*** -320.6***
(0.00)
(0.00)
[0.15]
[0.13]
215.6***
-158.9**
(0.01)
(0.03)
[0.20]
[0.39]

Control variables
Observations
Number of panel

Yes
192
9
7.061e+0
6

Yes
225
10

Yes
225
10

Yes
225
10

-111.8***
(0.00)
[0.10]
Yes
192
9
6.666e+0
6

-139.6*
(0.06)
[0.17]
Yes
192
9
3.241e+0
6

Wald chi2
8243
1909
7959
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: GLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-value
in square brackets. All social capital parameters are standardized. All trust parameters
are Trust 2 from the table 2.8 except in column (4) with Trust 1. For the estimation of
the stock the FCAs I and J in the table 2.1 share their stock variable because they
manage and harvest in the same fishing grounds.
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Table 2.13 Estimated Effect of Rev. Sharing/Cooperation on Perceived Outcomes
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards economic outcome
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Revenue Sharing
0.18
0.32
0.28
(0.39)
(0.11)
(0.15)
Unconditional
0.24
0.24
(0.12)
(0.12)
Conditional
-0.15
-0.14
(0.15)
(0.19)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
77
71
71
71
71
F
0.979
2.715
4.132
2.219
3.591
Root MSE
0.857
0.846
0.838
0.862
0.858
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards biological outcome
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Revenue Sharing
-0.02
-0.00
-0.02
(0.94)
(1.00)
(0.93)
0.05
0.05
Unconditional
(0.60)
(0.61)
Conditional
-0.13
-0.13
(0.33)
(0.32)
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
77
71
71
71
71
F
0.730
0.608
0.789
2.122
7.168
Root MSE
0.868
0.892
0.899
0.884
0.891
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: OLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and
bootstrapped p-value in square brackets. All cooperation parameters are
standardized. Control variables, all in logarithm, are the number of years
in shellfish fishing and the number of months in 2012 season except in
model 1 with the number of months only.
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Table 2.14 Estimated Effect of Trust/Information Network on Perceived
Outcomes
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards economic outcome
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Rev. Sharing
0.24
0.45**
(0.24)
(0.04)
[0.04]
Trust
0.17*
0.17
(0.09) (0.11)
[0.11] [0.14]
Varieties of
0.26** 0.22*
info shared
(0.03) (0.05)
[0.04] [0.06]
Frequency
0.38**
(0.01)
[0.01]
Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
70
70
54
54
58
F
3.700
5.392
3.175
4.886
5.380
Root MSE
0.842
0.840
0.872
0.851
0.810
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards biological outcome
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Rev. Sharing
-0.05
0.10
(0.84)
(0.73)
Trust
-0.07
-0.07
(0.65) (0.65)
Varieties of
0.32*
0.31*
info shared
(0.07) (0.08)
[0.13] [0.16]
Frequency
0.19
(0.13)

(6)
0.23
(0.26)

(7)
0.18
(0.44)
0.09
(0.34)
0.12
(0.23)

0.33**
(0.03)
[0.03]
Yes
58
5.205
0.811

0.26*
(0.08)
[0.14]
Yes
53
5.482
0.824

(6)
-0.08
(0.77)

(7)
0.00
(0.99)

0.21**
(0.05)
[0.07]
Yes
58
3.776
0.922

0.28*
(0.10)
[0.18]
0.11
(0.25)

Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
70
70
54
54
58
54
F
0.468
0.476
6.779
4.362
1.485
3.461
Root MSE
0.877
0.884
0.881
0.889
0.915
0.893
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: OLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped pvalue in square brackets. The trust parameters are Trust 1 from the table 2.8. All
social capital parameters are standardized. Control variables, all in logarithm, are
the number of years in shellfish fishing and the number of months in 2012
season.
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Table 2.15 Estimated Effect of Varieties of Information on Perceived Outcomes
Dependent Variable: Perceptions towards economic outcome
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Revenue sharing
0.59**
0.62**
0.63**
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.01)
[0.04]
[0.02]
[0.02]
Specific hot-spots
0.19*
0.21*
0.17
0.18*
(0.09)
(0.07)
(0.12)
(0.09)
[0.09]
[0.09]
[0.11]
0.18** 0.21** 0.17** 0.20**
High gear density
areas
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.03)
[0.10]
[0.09]
[0.12]
[0.11]
Yes
Yes
Control variables
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
54
54
54
54
54
54
F
2.227
3.181
4.044
9.621
3.760
9.614
Root MSE
0.894
0.853
0.891
0.845
0.888
0.838
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: OLS estimates. Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped pvalue in square brackets. Control variables are the number of existing
relationships, log of the number of years in shellfish fishing, and log of the
number of months in 2012 season.
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Figure 2.1 Hypotheses

Figure 2.2 Setup of the Experiment
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Appendix 2.1 Wild Cluster Bootstrap

Steps to conduct the wild cluster bootstrap with the null hypothesis imposed and sixpoint distribution are detailed in this appendix. These steps follow Cameron et al.
(2008). Cameron and Miller (2015) is a reference for implementation.
′
Consider a model 𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖 with G clusters and each cluster consists

of ng, 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑛𝑔 , 𝑔 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐺 observations with 𝐸�𝑢𝑔 � = 0, 𝐸�𝑢𝑔 𝑢𝑔′ � = Σ𝑔 , and
𝐸�𝑢𝑔 𝑢ℎ′ � = 0 for cluster ℎ ≠ 𝑔. Then the cluster-robust variance estimator is
−1 𝐺
−1
𝑉� �𝛽̂ � = �∑𝐺𝑔=1 𝑋𝑔′ 𝑋𝑔 � �𝐺−1 ∑𝐺𝑔=1�𝑋𝑔′ 𝑢�𝑔 ��𝑢�𝑔′ 𝑋𝑔 �� �∑𝐺𝑔=1 𝑋𝑔′ 𝑋𝑔 � .

1. Determine the null hypothesis H0: 𝛽𝑘 − 𝛽𝑘0 . From the original sample, form Wald

statistics, 𝑤 = �𝛽̂𝑘 − 𝛽𝑘0 ��𝑠𝛽�𝑘 using 𝑉� �𝛽̂ �.

Also, obtain the restricted OLS estimator 𝛽̂ 𝑅 that imposes the null hypothesis, and
the associated restricted OLS residuals {𝑢�1𝑅 , ⋯ , 𝑢�𝐺𝑅 }.

2. Do B iterations. On the bth iteration,

a. Form a sample of G clusters {(𝑦1∗ , 𝑋1∗ ), ⋯ , (𝑦𝐺∗ , 𝑋𝐺∗ )}. For each cluster
𝑔 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐺, form

3

1

2

1

1

1

𝑢�𝑔𝑅∗ = −�2 𝑢�𝑔𝑅 with 𝑝 = 6,
𝑢�𝑔𝑅∗ = −�2 𝑢�𝑔𝑅 with 𝑝 = 6,
𝑢�𝑔𝑅∗ = −�2 𝑢�𝑔𝑅 with 𝑝 = 6,
1

1

𝑢�𝑔𝑅∗ = �2 𝑢�𝑔𝑅 with 𝑝 = 6,
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2

1

𝑢�𝑔𝑅∗ = �2 𝑢�𝑔𝑅 with 𝑝 = 6,
3

1

𝑢�𝑔𝑅∗ = −�2 𝑢�𝑔𝑅 with 𝑝 = 6,

and then form 𝑦�𝑔∗ = 𝑋𝑔′ 𝛽̂ 𝑅 + 𝑢�𝑔𝑅∗ , 𝑔 = 1, ⋯ , 𝐺.

∗
∗
̂𝑘,𝑏
∗ , where 𝛽
∗
b. Calculate the Wald statistics, 𝑤𝑏∗ = �𝛽̂𝑘,𝑏
− 𝛽𝑘0 ��𝑠𝛽�𝑘,𝑏
and 𝑠𝛽�𝑘,𝑏

are obtained from unrestricted OLS estimation using the bth pseudo-sample,

∗ computed as in step 1.
with 𝑠𝛽�𝑘,𝑏

th
∗
∗
∗
3. Reject H0 at level 𝛼 iff 𝑤 < 𝑤[𝛼
⁄2] or 𝑤 < 𝑤[1−(𝛼⁄2)] , where 𝑤[𝑞] denote the q

quantile of 𝑤1∗ , ⋯ , 𝑤𝐵∗ .

For GLS estimation, replace all the OLS estimators with the GLS estimator.
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Appendix 2.2 Complete Results

Table 2.16 Estimated Effects of Cooperation on Price (Complete)
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Table 2.17 Estimated Effects of Cooperation on Stock (Complete)
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Table 2.18 Estimated Effects of Trust on Price (Complete)

124

Table 2.19 Estimated Effects of Trust on Stock (Complete)
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Table 2.20 Estimated Effects of Information Network (Density and Size) on Price (Complete)
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Table 2.21 Estimated Effects of Information Network (Varieties and Frequency) on Price (Complete)

127

Table 2.22 Estimated Effects of Information Network (Density and Size) on Stock (Complete)
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Table 2.23 Estimated Effects of Information Network (Varieties and Frequency) on Stock (Complete)
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Table 2.24 Estimated Effects of Various Social Capital Parameters on Price/Stock (Complete)
A.

B.
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Table 2.25 Estimated Effects of Trust/Cooperation on Perceived Economic Outcome (Complete)
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Table 2.26 Estimated Effects of Information Network on Perceived Economic Outcome (Complete)
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Table 2.27 Estimated Effects of Cooperation/Trust on Perceived Biological Outcome (Complete)
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Table 2.28 Estimated Effects of Information Network on Perceived Biological Outcome (Complete)
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Table 2.29 Estimated Effects of Types of Information Shared on Perceived Economic Outcome (Complete)

135

MANUSCRIPT – 3
Do Management Systems Foster Social Capital? Empirical Evidence from
Japanese Surf Clam Fisheries
In preparation for journal submission
by
Mihoko Tegawa 1 and Hirotsugu Uchida1

1

Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island.

136

Do Management Systems Foster Social Capital? Empirical Evidence from
Japanese Surf Clam Fisheries
Mihoko Tegawa and Hirotsugu Uchida
Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
University of Rhode Island
Abstract
We empirically examine the social effect of management systems. We focus on a
particular management practice employed in self-governed coastal fisheries in Japan—
revenue sharing arrangement. We hypothesize that management systems affect
cooperative relationships and information network in a community; broadly termed as
social capital. We quantified social capital using controlled economic experiments
with fisherman subjects as well as surveys. Using wild cluster bootstrap for small
sample inference, we find evidence of the positive effect of revenue sharing on
information network possibly because revenue sharing arrangement provides
disincentives to compete and accompanies synchronized collective fishing operation.
Interestingly, revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate unconditionally
(i.e., unilaterally) and furthermore they are less likely to cooperate conditionally (i.e.,
only if others cooperate).
Keywords: information network, cooperation, partnership, fishery cooperatives
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3.1 Introduction
While the primary assumption in economics is that every agent is motivated by selfinterest, importance of immaterial motivations such as moral, reputation, and values in
economic decision-making has been recognized for a long time. From Adam Smith to
Amartya Sen, the vast literature stressing importance of immaterial, unselfish
motivations (e.g., so-called ‘warm-glow’) exists. In fact, many attempts to incorporate
immaterial motives in an economic model have been made (e.g., Andreoni, 1989;
Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Gaspart & Seki, 2003). In
what follows, we examine the possibility of nurturing such motivations in a form of
social capital. In particular, we focus on understanding how social capital can be
fostered in a commons dilemma, a typical example of market failure when the costs
and/or the prices do not convey all information. Its understanding is not only
important but also relevant in policy discussion to help us achieve ultimately better
economic outcomes.
More recent studies on environmental policies highlight the reasons why more
attention should be paid to immaterial motives when designing a policy. Behavioral
response to monetary incentives sometimes does not align with regulator’s intention as
referred as crowding out (Cardenas, Stranlund, & Willis, 2000). In the worst-case
scenario, economic incentives induced by an institutional setup may undermine
individual voluntary motivation to contribute to a better world that would have
prevailed otherwise (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Carlsson & Johansson-Stenman,
2012). In particular, in a social dilemma situation such as a fishery each harvester may
contribute to the group interest because of moral or reputation among harvesters (e.g.
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Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Brekke, Kverndokk, & Nyborg, 2003; Gaspart & Seki,
2003). Trust or reciprocity among members, or social norms can support individual
motivation to make sincere commitment to a group interest in a closed society. These
studies suggest that non-monetary incentives can play an important role in ensuring
success of implementing a policy.
Non-monetary incentives discussed above comprise many aspects of social
capital. Social capital is a concept that attributes such as trust, cooperation, and
reciprocity among people, and norms and networks in a community are important in
improving economic life (Fukuyama, 1996; Putnam, 2001). A stream of the literature
on the commons has highlighted important roles of social capital in a community that
self-governs a community resource (e.g. Ahn & Ostrom, 2008; Bowles & Gintis,
2002; Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011; Pretty, 2003).
Formal economic institutions—markets and property rights—have been
recognized as fundamental in determining organizational as well as national economic
success (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; North, 1973, 2005; Williamson,
1975). As Acemoglu et al. (2005, p. 397) state: “differences in economic institutions
are the fundamental cause of different patterns of economic growth.” Different
economic institutions induce various incentives for people to innovate, to invest, to
save for the future, and to provide public goods, which results in differences in
economic success. They not only determine the size of a pie but also how a pie should
be distributed.
Needless to say the same argument applies to management of the commons.
Institutional arrangements inside and outside of the commons influence how

139

successfully resource users can manage the resource and thus benefit from their own
resource use (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1989). Whether or not
access to the resource is restricted to a limited number of users can alter the incentives
for conservation and thus the resulting economic outcomes. Similarly establishment of
any types of property rights for resource usage can mitigate some of the externality
causing rent dissipation in the commons and improve economic efficiency.
Another stream of the literature suggests that economic institutions do more
than changing economic incentives and distributing goods and services; they also
affect the accumulation of social capital. Bowles (1998, p. 75) argues that they “also
influence the evolution of values, tastes, and personalities” based on cases drawn from
experimental economics, history, and other social sciences. Bowles (1998) also points
out that moral, ethics, or personality matters especially in the cases of incomplete
contracting and asymmetric information, which are prevalent in the real world
including many commons situations.
The hypothesis that economic institutions affect social capital can provide
important policy implications, because the level of social capital has been shown to be
associated with economic performance. In fact, Carpenter and Seki (2011) showed a
strong correlation between fishermen’s propensity to cooperate (one aspect of social
capital) and fishing productivity. Social capital is also found to be empirically
associated with economic productivity in other workplace (e.g. Barr & Serneels, 2009;
Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carter & Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 2005; Knack &
Keefer, 1997).
In this paper we empirically test the hypothesis that social capital can be
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fostered by formal economic institutions. In other words, differences in the levels of
social capital in a fishing community can be explained by differences in management
systems governing fisheries. In so doing we rigorously quantify the effect of
management systems on accumulation of social capital.
To test the hypothesis, we focus on a particular management system employed
in a fishery—revenue sharing arrangement—as our empirical case study. Revenue
sharing arrangement is a type of management rule in a fishery, in which harvesters
share catch and/or profits among the members of a fishery cooperative. Employment
of such arrangement is a collective action that a group of harvesters takes. The
economic roles of revenue sharing in fishery management have been examined in the
literature (e.g. Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008).
To our knowledge this study is the first to investigate the consequence of revenue
sharing arrangement on social aspect of a community and empirically quantify the
effects.
This paper provides the quantitative effect of management systems—whether
the group has employed revenue sharing or not—on the social aspect of a community
(social capital). In particular, this paper asks whether a difference in management
systems can result in different cooperative relationships and different information
networks in a community. This paper provides the first rigorous analysis to measure
the effect of different management systems on social capital and provides insights into
an effective policy that can be employed for development of social capital.
The data were collected from Japanese fisheries, many of whom operating
under revenue sharing have been successfully managing the resources as well as
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generating resource rents (Platteau & Seki, 2001; Uchida & Baba, 2008). For the
purpose of this paper, social capital is narrowly defined as cooperation and
information network, as these are most relevant to fishing operation as a community.
To quantify cooperation, controlled economic experiments with fishermen subjects
were conducted. As for information network, indices are constructed from survey
responses of the same fisherman subjects. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-value method
for small sample inference was then used to rigorously quantify the effect of revenue
sharing.
Revenue sharing arrangement can be an alternative management practice to
solve problems in common-pool resource management that cannot be resolved by
other emerging management tools such as Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ). While
it can mitigate the externality in a fishery resulting from the common property nature,
the ITQ, which was first suggested by Christy (1973), often fails to overcome
excessive competition across spaces and times, let alone political difficulty in
implementation (Boyce, 1992; Copes, 1986). Revenue sharing arrangement can be one
of a few systems to foster cooperation and information sharing in a fishery; it can
provide cause for a group and can encourage a cooperative environment for fishing
rather than competitively fishing only for self-interests.

3.2 Japanese surf clam fishing in Hokkaido Prefecture
Any entities that conduct commercial fishing in Japan’s coastal waters must belong to
a local Fishery Cooperative Association (FCA). These FCAs not only enforce national
and prefectural regulations but also self-regulate the resources tailored to local
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conditions. Within an FCA many groups of fishers are formed mainly based on the
species they target and/or the fishing gear they use. Each group has their own rules of
regulation and management and can decide whether to share revenue.
Based on the data provided by Uchida and Wilen (2007), many of the revenuesharing groups are concentrated in the northeastern Japan, target sedentary species,
and use small-scale trawl or gillnets. The coastal fisheries in southern Japan are
characterized with fishing many species with the same fishing technology, which
complicates the process to share revenue. Many sedentary species fisheries are
required to employ small-scale trawl and gillnets by regulation, which results in
relatively smaller heterogeneity in fishing skills and outcomes compared to other
migratory species or other fishing technology such as fishing bonito. According to
Fishery Census of Japan, the fishing groups that share revenue accounted for 11
percent of all groups in Japan in 1988 and the percentage increased to 17 percent until
1998, in which consistent data are available. 1
We chose the Japanese/Sakhalin surf clam (Pseudocardium sachalinensis)
fishery, known as Hokkigai in Hokkaido Prefecture, for this study for several reasons.
There are a sufficient number of groups engaged in this fishery in the same Hokkaido
Prefecture. There are also sufficient variations in with or without revenue sharing
while relatively homogeneous in other operational rules.
Focusing on a particular region and carefully selecting groups based on the
data from Uchida and Wilen (2007), but without controlling the outcomes, enables us
to control many observed and possibly unobserved characteristics at the time of

1

In 2003 the ratio of revenue sharing among all groups dropped to 12% partly because the definition of
fishing groups was changed. In later censuses no comparable information has been provided.
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sampling. Harvesting technology is another factor controlled at the time of sampling.
For many years all sampled fishery groups employ the jet dredges, by far the most
common and the most advanced technology for harvesting the surf clams.
The way the FCAs in Hokkaido organize their shellfish fishery is practically
identical. It involves (1) stock assessment conducted by the staff members at Fisheries
Extension Offices located all over Hokkaido in collaboration with the local skippers
and FCAs, either prior to or after every fishing season; (2) all skippers are called to
gather for a pre-season meeting to hear the results of the stock assessment from the
local Fisheries Extension Office, to decide a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the
coming season, and to review operational rules and policy for the season; and (3)
during the season a leader and sub-leaders closely watch the market prices (mostly by
directly talking with the middlemen) and decide whether to go fishing on the day and
if so how much to land subject to the seasonal TAC. 2 Each group usually has an
elected leader and multiple sub-leaders for the groups of a significant size. Finally, (4)
during and/or after the season whether they share revenue or not all skippers in all
FCAs are required to contribute to the collective efforts to make the fishery favorable
for growth of the Japanese surf clams although how much to contribute can vary
across the FCAs. These efforts include cultivating ocean beds, removing predators,
and transplanting clams. Many FCAs also buy juvenile clams from other fisheries and
release them in their waters.
The sample consists of ten fishery groups, five of which are under revenue
sharing and the other five are not and have never been under such arrangement. They
2

Individual skippers can decide whether or not to fish on the day a leader decides to go fishing, but they
cannot go fishing when the leader decides not to go. On the other hand, when a group shares revenue,
skippers must follow a leader’s decision; all skippers fish or do not fish altogether.

144

all engage in a small-scale trawl fishery, targeting the Japanese surf clams, and are
located in Hokkaido prefecture (eight of them are in Kushiro/Nemuro region, eastern
Hokkaido), which means facing the same market, biological conditions, and historical
backgrounds. All the groups self-manage the resources of the Japanese surf clams as
detailed above; they voluntarily set a TAC based on the stock assessment; they
perform the collective efforts for stock enhancement such as stocking and
transplanting. All fishers, regardless of management systems, depart from their ports
at the sunrise (regulation set by the government), but only revenue sharing fishers
return to the ports all together at the same time. Some revenue sharing fishers
designate themselves to specific fishing grounds prior to departure and communicate
over the radio on the sea about who catch how much in where, further adjusting effort
allocation on the sea. In other words, the sampled groups are only different in a
decision to employ revenue sharing arrangement accompanied by collective fishing
operation in major management/operational rules, but the degree of self-regulation can
differ across the FCAs.
The fishers under revenue sharing are financially motivated to coordinate
allocation of fishing efforts in both spatial and temporal dimensions; collective fishing
operation financially supported by revenue sharing arrangement can further facilitate
development of social capital in a fishing community. On the other hand, the nonrevenue sharing fishers do not have such an incentive because their profits solely
depend on their own catch and the benefits of effort allocation may not accrue to all
the fishers equally. The non-revenue sharing fishers do still need to interact with each
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other in fishing operation as a member of the FCA, but the interaction is not
financially motivated.

3.3 Methods
We collected this unique dataset containing 79 observations from ten fishery groups in
Japan. The dataset consists of individual social capital parameters, each of which will
be regressed on a group management indicator—whether sharing revenue or not—and
other individual demographic variables for controls.
Although social capital involves various attributes, the focus in this study is on
cooperation measured by controlled economic experiments with fishermen subjects
and information network measured by the survey. Use of experimental method to
measure traditionally hard-to-measure variables such as social capital has been
advocated in previous studies (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Cardenas & Carpenter, 2005;
Carpenter, 2002), and in fact many applications exist (e.g., Barr & Serneels, 2009;
Bouma, Bulte, & van Soest, 2008; Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, & Hwang, 2009;
Carpenter & Seki, 2011; Carter & Castillo, 2002; Karlan, 2005). Glaeser et al. (2000)
carefully compared the experimental method with the survey method and concluded
that experiments could be combined with surveys to supplement to each other.
First we detail construction of cooperation parameters with the experiment and
then construction of information network indices with the survey. Then, we introduce
empirical strategy to estimate the outcome variables (social capital parameters) with
our variable of interest (a group management variable).
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Cooperation parameters
To measure cooperation among fishermen the standard, repeated Voluntary
Contribution Mechanism (VCM) was conducted (Camerer & Fehr, 2004; Carpenter,
2002). Participants were recruited through the FCAs, and many of them held some
executive positions in the fishery groups at the time of recruitment. A flyer was
provided with the FCAs to make general calls for the experiments and the surveys, and
the flyer indicated that the volunteers would be asked to participate in economic
experiment (play a simple game) in addition to a survey on fishing operation and they
would be paid in cash fixed participation fees plus the earnings from the experiment.
Before the experiment began participants were randomly divided into groups
of four persons that were sustained for an entire session. The participants were not told
whom they were playing with. 3 The participants were given 3,000 yen (roughly
US$30) worth of coins as an endowment every round and asked how much to
contribute to a public good from his endowment. Once all the participants made their
decision the total contribution of each group was calculated, doubled by the
experimenter, and then distributed equally among the group members. The amount not
contributed to a public good was kept to the participants. The participants earn a sum
of the dividends from a public good, regardless of their own contribution to a public
good, and the money kept to themselves for a round. The dominant strategy in the
game is to contribute nothing because marginal return from a public good is smaller
than the one from a private account regardless of total group contribution. The game

3

In case that the number of participants was not multiple of four, which happened at most sessions, the
contribution amounts of some participants were counted twice in multiple groups to avoid the effect of
varying group size as in Carpenter and Williams (2010).
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was repeated ten times with the exception of one session. 4 At the end of the
experiment two of the ten rounds were randomly drawn as a binding round and the
participants were paid the average of the payoffs from the two rounds plus a
participation fee of 3,000 yen. 5
All the sessions took place in a conference room at the FCA or at the
community center nearby. The participants were seated facing the wall, and in
between the participants portable blinds were constructed (Figure 3.1). At the
beginning of every round the participants were given three boxes in different colors. In
a yellow box were 3,000 yen worth of coins—real money—as an endowment, a red
box was intended for a private account, and a green box was for public good
contribution. The participants were asked to move all the coins from the yellow box to
either the red box (to keep) or the green box (to contribute), which made it difficult to
guess what other participants were doing based on the amount of the noise made from
moving coins. Once all the participants made their decision the experimenters
collected all the boxes and calculated the total contribution of each group and the
dividends from a public good. These results were written down on a sheet of paper and
distributed to the participants with the three boxes and the coins for the next round.

4

The last five rounds were conducted with social disapproval treatment introduced by Carpenter and
Seki (2011). However, in this study we do not consider the parameters obtained by this treatment
although the observations during these rounds are used for estimation. The session at one FCA repeated
the standard VCM for six times with another version of social disapproval for the last two rounds.
5
A participation fee was set high in this experiment to mitigate concern expressed by many FCA staffs
for performance-based payment. The experiment accommodated two more games for different research
and thus the session lasted between 2.5 hours and 3 hours. The voluntary contribution mechanism lasted
less than 1.5 hours and the average earning from this game was 4,700 yen.
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A total of 80 fishermen participated in the experiment; two subjects were
excluded from the analysis. 6 Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of participants. One 7
to 16 skippers from each FCA that ranges from 12 to 100 percent of all member
skippers participated in a session (Table 3.2). As expected, the smaller the FCAs are
the more comprehensive the sampled participants are. How representative the sample
is uncertain because of unavailability of information on non-participants in the same
FCA. The FCAs greater than ten targeted the skippers who held some positions in the
group at the time of the experiments in addition to general calls directed towards all
members because these skippers would feel more obligated to cooperate for research.
The bottom line is that selection of the participants was done similarly across the
FCAs of a lower participation rate.
The mean contribution of all participants is 1,635 yen (55% of endowment)
with individual contribution ranging from zero to 3,000 yen (0-100% of endowment).
Revenue sharing fishers on average contributed 1,600 yen (53%) to a public good,
compared with the average contribution by non-revenue sharing fishers of 1,762 yen
(59%). The difference is statistically significant at p-value = 0.004 (Mann-WhitneyWilcoxon test). However, this does not necessarily imply that revenue sharing-fishers
cooperate less because in the sample they are statistically significantly younger than
6

One subject was a FCA staff and did not face the same incentive as other subjects. He did not expect
to receive any compensation during the experiment and planned to surrender it to his supervisor. He
was needed in the session because only four fishers showed up, which would identify exactly whom
they were playing the game with. Difference in the degree of anonymity potentially alters the incentives
because the participants know each other. The other subject was an elderly skipper who contributed all
of his endowment throughout the session. At the end of the session he gave his earnings to his grandson
who worked at the FCA. It is apparent that he did not take a series of decisions seriously. The average
contribution made by the other three members in the group with the FCA staff was smaller than the rest
of the participants and the average contribution in the group with the elderly skipper was greater, and
these two groups (excluding the FCA staff and the skipper) are significantly different from the rest of
the participants at p value < 0.01 respectively.
7
One participant from one FCA attended the joint session with another FCA.
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non-revenue sharing fishers, which is a very important demographic characteristic that
can affect how much to contribute (Aswani, Gurney, Mulville, Matera, & Gurven,
2013). In fact, significant difference between the two groups disappears after
controlling for age. 8 For comparison, the same experiment by Carpenter and Seki
(2011) with fisherman subjects yielded the overall average contribution of 49% (N =
27) with revenue sharing fishers contributing 51% and non-revenue sharing fishers
contributing 46%. This suggests that the fishermen in our study contributed slightly
more overall regardless of management systems and the difference in contribution
between revenue sharing fishers and non-revenue sharing fishers went in the opposite
direction.
The observed amount contributed to a public good, y, in round t by subject i in
session j is censored between zero and 3,000 and is related to a latent variable, y*, as
follows.

𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �

∗
if 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
≤0
∗
∗
𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 if 0 < 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
< 3000.
∗
3000 if 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 3000

0

The amount contributed to a public good, y, is regressed on a sum of contribution
made by other members in the previous round, 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) . The model needs to allow

individual variation for this coefficient for the reason to be apparent later and thus
accommodates a random parameter for 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) . In addition, it is likely to be
8

The OLS without controlling for age (Contributeijt = 𝛼 + Rev.Sharingj + eijt; Adjusted R2 for the model
is 0.009) implies that revenue sharing skippers contribute on average 202 yen less than the average nonrevenue sharing skipper at p value=0.006 while the OLS controlling for age (Contributeijt = 𝛼 +
Rev.Sharingj + agei + eijt; Adjusted R2 for the model is 0.040) does not find significant difference
between the two groups (p value=0.204). Multilevel modeling incorporating random effects of
individuals nested within sessions also yields similar results; revenue sharing is not a significant factor
(p value=0.431) when age is controlled for (Wald statistics for the model is 6.73).

150

correlated within the same subject nested within the same session and thus the two
random effects for subjects and for sessions are also estimated.
We estimated this model using Generalized Latent Variable Model (Skrondal
& Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). This model is very flexible that it estimates multi-level
random effects as well as one random parameter while allowing the Tobit
specification simultaneously. The model is estimated with the following specification.
3
2
Γ�𝐸�𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 |𝑿, 𝒖�� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) ,

where 𝛽𝟎 and 𝛽1 are parameters to be estimated, 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) is a vector of a sum of

1
are random
contribution made by other members in the previous round, 𝑢𝑗1 and 𝑢𝑖𝑖

3
effects for sessions and subjects, 𝑢𝑖𝑖
is a random parameter, Γ(∙) is a link function (the

∗
identity or the probit function), and 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖
is distributed as Gaussian or Bernoulli. We

assume

3
2
𝐸�𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 |𝒖� = Γ −1 �𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑿−𝑖𝑖(𝑡−1) �.

Table 3.3 shows estimation results of the model. An average participant
contributes 1,272 yen and an individual variation is in a range of 998 yen standard
deviation, which is both economically and statistically significant. An average
participant contributes 0.06 yen (the average marginal effect on the observed
distribution) more to a public good after observing a marginal increase in the
contribution by the other members, which is statistically significant but not
economically significant. This varies across individuals in a 0.08 yen standard
deviation at a statistically insignificant level.
The results suggest that the participants care about what the others’
contribution is and do respond to it cooperatively. The positive coefficient for 𝛽1
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implies that they do not shirk and cooperate more when the others cooperate more.
However, a dominant part of their strategies is their own contribution level determined
outside of what the others did in the previous round. The participants are a group of
people who interact daily or at least regularly in a fishery regardless of their
management systems. It is possible that they decide their contribution based on the
relationship they have in a daily life rather than on what the other participants did in
2
this experiment. This is captured in 𝛽0 and its variation across individuals as 𝑢𝑖𝑖
.

The two parameters for cooperation are created: conditional cooperation and

unconditional cooperation (Carpenter & Williams, 2010; Carpenter & Seki, 2011).
3
and measures how
The conditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢𝑖𝑖

cooperative a person is in response to observed cooperativeness of the other members.
A greater value of this parameter indicates that a person is willing to cooperate more
after knowing the others’ cooperation than an average subject in the sample. The
2
unconditional cooperation parameter takes a value of 𝑢𝑖𝑖
and measures general

cooperativeness of a person after taking into account conditional cooperation. The
greater the value of this parameter, the more cooperative a person is independently
from what the others are doing. Table 3.4 shows summary statistics of the two
parameters that are normally distributed by assumption.

Information network indices
Participants completed a survey for demographics and answered questions on
information network among fishermen such as the number of other fishermen they
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exchange information with. The indices for information network are constructed from
these survey responses.
Based on the work by Holland et al. (2010) and Holland et al. (2013), we
construct the measures of information network a skipper has in the shellfish fishery
(Table 3.5). The size of information network is constructed by the survey response to
the question asking the number of shellfish fishermen with whom to have shared
important information that potentially affected own profits from shellfish fishing
during the fishing season in 2012. An average skipper in these fishery groups shared
such information with ten skippers. Normalizing the size by the possible number of
relationships (the size of a fishery group) yields density of information network. An
average density was about 30 percent, ranging from 0 to 100 percent. This indicates,
for example, in the case of the fishery group comprised of ten fishermen an average
fisherman would have shared important information with three other fishermen.
After listing five names of fishermen with whom a person has most important
relationships, participants were asked what kinds of information they shared with each
of the relationships. 9 Based on the information provided by FCA staff, six kinds of
information were identified as relevant to the surf clam fishery: market, buyer
information, specific hot-spots, market for bycatch and its hot-spots, high gear density
areas, and boat and gear. Taking the average of the number of kinds of information a
person shared with the listed relationships produces an index for varieties of
information exchanged. An average fisher shared about two types of information.
Among the six kinds the information on specific hot-spots was shared most, followed
9

Some skippers refused to provide the names of other skippers because they feel that they would leak
personal information of others, which resulted in a lower response rate for the subsequent questions on
varieties of information and frequency of sharing the information than the other questions.
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by market information (Figure 3.2). Information on boat and gear is also important in
these fisheries as reflected by the rule of many FCAs that more than one skipper 10 are
required to fish in one boat. These fishermen regard other fishermen as being close
friends (49%) and having common in boat and gear (33%).
Frequency of sharing the six types of information listed above during a 2012
season was asked for each relationship in a scale of one to seven: 1 as frequent as
everyday, 2 as every few days, 3 as once per week, 4 as once every two weeks, 5 as
once per month, 6 as every two months, 7 as once during the season. An average
skipper shared the important information with other skippers at least once a week
during the season. To avoid confusion, the reverse coded index will be used for main
estimation for frequency.

Empirical estimation
We are interested in estimating the effect of revenue sharing on each parameter/index
for social capital defined above. Estimation will provide empirical evidence of how
management systems affect social aspect of a fishing community. It will also clarify
what aspect of a fishing community management system can and cannot influence.
Each parameter of social capital is taken as a dependent variable in a separate
OLS regression. In all regression models, standard errors are estimated with cluster
robust variance estimator and then are bootstrapped with the wild cluster bootstrap
(Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2008). The variable of interest is a binary variable
taking 1 if a fisher is under revenue sharing and 0 otherwise. Other variables for
10

A term ‘skipper’ used in this study means a fisher who is independent and not hired for a fixed
remuneration by a captain. Therefore a skipper may jointly own a boat or pay a fixed charter fees to an
owner.
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controls in the model include demographic information of fishers: log of age, the
number of persons in the household, education levels, and log of the number of years
in shellfish fishing. 11
One may argue that the OLS estimates suffer from selection bias. While
revenue sharing can affect social capital parameters, social capital could influence the
decision for a fisher to select into a revenue sharing group. Carpenter and Seki (2011)
discussed that the selection bias for revenue sharing as an individual decision is not a
significant problem in Japanese fisheries because each fisher did not self-select into
the system. While individual decisions to adopt revenue sharing may not possess
selection bias observed in selecting into job training, adoption of revenue sharing
arrangement is possibly nonrandom. Preferences, value, and experience of individual
fishers have been likely to affect the group decision to adopt revenue sharing. Suenaga
(2008) emphasized the importance of involving fishers in the decision making process
in Sandfish fishery in Japan. All the fishers surveyed in the Japanese surf clam fishery
who gave valid response (64% of the respondents) suggested some involvement in the
process for a change in operational rules in the fishery.
One may also argue that the OLS estimates are biased due to endogeneity.
There may exist another mechanism that can influence the decision to employ revenue
sharing while correlated with unobservables captured in the error term. One possible
scenario is a catastrophic event in a shellfish fishery such as depletion of the resource
due to overfishing, disease, weather, or all combined. Careful examination of
background information suggests that this is not the case. First, we asked in the survey

11

Correlation between these variables is not a concern. Age and shellfish experience are most correlated
and their correlation coefficient is 0.57.
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whether they have seen the shellfish resources depleted or drastically decreased. After
dropping 13 individuals who have been in the fishery for less than 10 years, we found
71 percent of revenue sharing fishers answered “yes” to the question while 72 percent
of non-revenue sharing fishers did, which is not a statistically significant difference
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.63). We also examined a numerical
measure of resource stock density over the last 20 years or so (Figure 3.3). The mean
density of revenue sharing groups was 0.59 kilograms per squared meter of fishing
grounds and the mean density of non-revenue sharing groups was 0.54. We found
these distributions between the two groups not statistically significantly different
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p value = 0.61). This can be also supported by the fact
that all the fishery groups, regardless of management systems, have been selfimposing a TAC for the last 20 years at least.
Causal inference of the estimates crucially depends on how well unobserved
heterogeneity is controlled because occurrence of revenue sharing arrangement is
possibly nonrandom. The sampled fishery groups have been controlled on some
important observables at the time of sampling; some relevant characteristics of
individual fishers will be controlled in a regression. Unobservables consist of a part
that is correlated with observables and a part that is uncorrelated. The estimates are
valid to the degree of how closely related the observables are to the unobservables and
thus how well these observables capture unobserved heterogeneity.
Concerns for standard errors still remain. The small sample problem of ten
fishery groups can understate the standard deviation of the OLS estimators. The
literature has been casting doubts on inference based on cluster-robust standard errors
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when they are applied to the data containing a few clusters and the invariant variables
of interest within a cluster (Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan,
2004; Donald & Lang, 2007). Asymptotic justification of cluster-robust standard
errors relies on the assumption that the number of clusters goes to infinity. Clearly, the
data with ten clusters (groups) do not meet this assumption.
Although several solutions have been proposed, the wild cluster bootstrap
analyzed in Cameron et al. (2008) is the most appropriate in this study. The wild
cluster bootstrap is different from the standard bootstrap method with cluster option
commonly implemented by statistical software such as Stata or SAS. The wild cluster
bootstrap can overcome the problems with having a few clusters and invariant
variables within a cluster by forming pseudo-samples based on the residuals and using
“asymptotically pivotal” statistic. A statistic is said to be asymptotically pivotal if its
asymptotic distribution does not depend on any unknown parameters. With a few
clusters this feature is crucial. While the standard bootstrap directly evaluates the
distribution of the OLS estimates, the wild cluster bootstrap forms the Wald statistics
for every pseudo-sample and evaluates the distribution of these Wald statistics, which
is asymptotically pivotal.
The wild cluster bootstrap also solves the issue with invariant variables within
a cluster, which can be an issue with the standard bootstrap with cluster option. In
forming pseudo-samples the wild cluster bootstrap does this based on residuals not on
pairs of a dependent variable and explanatory variables, which have a good chance of
replicating the same pseudo-samples if explanatory variables do not vary within a
cluster.
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Cameron et al. (2008) recommend to implement the wild cluster bootstrap with
the null hypothesis imposed. Instead of using two-point distribution originally applied
by Cameron et al. (2008), Webb (2014) proposes to use six-point distribution, which is
recommended especially for the data with a very few clusters, say less than 10
clusters. This can greatly increase the number of possible values of the estimated Wald
statistics from pseudo-samples.
Another method, bias-reduced linearization (BRL) originally proposed by Bell
and McCaffrey (2002) and applied by Angrist and Lavy (2009), can also achieve
asymptotic refinement. However, it is not suitable with the data in this study as
underlying heteroskedasticity is likely to be severe due to unbalanced clusters. Monte
Carlo simulations in Cameron et al. (2008) show that when there is heteroskadsticity,
BRL no longer improves inference whereas the wild cluster bootstrap still does.

3.4 Results
Overall we find that the implementation of revenue sharing affects formation of some
aspects of social capital (Table 3.6). In particular, revenue sharing arrangement has a
negative impact on conditional cooperation while it has a positive impact on
information sharing among fishers.
First, we hypothesized that revenue sharing arrangement enhances cooperative
relationship among fishers; the relationship fishers face in daily fishing operation,
which can significantly depend on whether fishers are under revenue sharing
arrangement, may force the fishers to be unconditionally and conditionally cooperate
with each other. Interestingly, the results show that revenue sharing arrangement does
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not influence unconditional cooperation among fishers but does influence conditional
cooperation negatively (Table 3.6). This implies that revenue sharing fishers are no
more likely to cooperate unconditionally although revenue sharing arrangement seems
to require greater cooperation among fishers. In addition, the negative sign of
conditional cooperation among revenue sharing fishers suggests that the fishers under
revenue sharing are not only uncooperative to the group but also they are less likely to
cooperate even when they see the others contributing to the group. In addition, the
degree of uncooperativeness in conditional cooperation (the conditional average
difference in conditional cooperation between revenue sharing fishers and nonrevenue sharing fishers) is significant considering the range of the estimated variance
of the parameter. However, it should be noted that an overall explanatory power of
conditional cooperation was found to be trivial from the earlier examination in Section
5.3.
Second, we find evidence of the effect of revenue sharing on information
network (Table3.6). Although revenue sharing does not necessarily increase or
decrease network density and network size, it does increase the varieties of
information shared and frequency of sharing such information. The fishers under
revenue sharing share on average 0.6 more varieties of information than non-revenue
sharing fishers and they share such information much more frequently. The estimated
effect of 2.02 in a scale of frequency can be interpreted as an increase in frequency
from every two weeks (-4) to every two days (-2). An average fisher in the sample
shares two kinds of information about a fishery with information on specific hot-spots
being most likely and the market information the second most likely. In addition to
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these two kinds of information an average revenue sharing fisher is more likely to
share the information on boat and gear while non-revenue sharing fisher on average
shares two kinds out of these varieties. This may reflect the fact that revenue sharing
fishers operate fishing together as a group, which can require more detailed
information about what other group members are doing being shared amongst them.
The collective daily fishing operation, contribution to which can be aligned with selfinterest under revenue sharing arrangement, can motivate fishers to communicate
more frequently with each other and to share more information. Interestingly, revenue
sharing arrangement does not seem to affect the absolute size of information network
or the normalized size of the network.
The wild cluster bootstrap yields the same significance level of the estimates as
the cluster robust standard error p value. Thus, the inference of significance of the
estimates remains the same even after correcting for the small sample. These results
are consistent with the results obtained by BRL, which was discussed as another
method to address with small sample inference.

3.5 Discussion
Economic institutions can influence what social relationships people in a community
have beyond their realm of economic outcomes. In this paper we examine how
different management systems in a fishery result in different levels of social capital in
a community, focusing on revenue sharing arrangement and an individual fishing
quota. The results suggest that revenue sharing arrangement leads to less conditional
cooperation among fishers while no impact is found in unconditional cooperation.
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Revenue sharing arrangement, accompanied by collective fishing operation, changes
how fishers communicate with other fishers; revenue sharing fishers exchange more
varieties of fishing information more frequently.
The negative effect on conditional cooperation is somewhat contrary to the
literature on the VCM (Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, & Hwang, 2009), which suggested
that strong reciprocity was a key in team production. The result in this study implies
that a key in team production is not necessarily conditional cooperation or reciprocity
at least in a context of revenue sharing arrangement in a fishery. The fishers under
revenue sharing, who face the same incentive structure as the VCM, are not
necessarily conditional cooperators but rather free-riders. Yet, these fishery groups
have been successfully maintaining the revenue sharing arrangement for decades. This
can suggest two things. First, the other factor may have been contributing to the
maintenance of revenue sharing arrangement in these fishery groups. One possible
factor is their operational rules that the fishery groups under revenue sharing
arrangement self-impose. Every fishery group under revenue sharing arrangement
operates together to ensure equal contribution of labor in days and hours among the
member fishers. Contrary to anonymity in the VCM, contribution in fishing operation
can be easily monitored in terms of landings at the port. Although the fishers have
incentives to free-ride, they may still like to compete in fishing, which can counteract
free-riding inclinations exhibited in the VCM. Gaspart and Seki (2003) emphasized
fishers’ nature for competition as an important driver to maintain the revenue sharing
arrangement. Anecdotal evidence also exists to support this claim; we heard from a
leader fisherman that his fellow fishers still compete for landings even though they
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have been under revenue sharing for decades. Second, another possibility is that the
estimated coefficient of revenue sharing arrangement may be suffering from
endogeneity. If these revenue sharing fishery groups had been particularly struggling
with free-riding in collective efforts such as the efforts for the stock enhancement, the
groups could have been in a way forced to employ revenue sharing to motivate these
collective efforts. If this is the case, the estimate from the model is biased and is not a
true effect of revenue sharing on conditional cooperation.
The effect of revenue sharing on information network can be attributable to
collective fishing operation as well as revenue sharing arrangement. In daily fishing
operation revenue sharing fishers fish together as a group and coordinate their fishing
efforts and their stock enhancing activities. This way of operation in fishing requires
revenue sharing fishers to communicate more information more frequently because
information can help fishers to successfully cooperate in fishing, on which revenue
can greatly hinge and fishers are financially bound together by revenue sharing
arrangement.
Insignificant estimated coefficients of the size of information network and the
density of the network suggest that revenue sharing fishers do not necessarily share
information with more people compared with non-revenue sharing fishers although
they exchange more varieties of information more frequently. Revenue sharing
arrangement can provide disincentive to hold back on sharing sensitive fishing
information. For example, sharing information on specific hot-spots can decrease the
return from fishing effort at the presence of congestion externality, and thus harvesters
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may prefer to keep it private. However, it is in their interest for revenue sharing fishers
to share such information to allocate their collective fishing effort most efficiently.
This may also suggest that revenue sharing fishers have different structure of
communication that do not necessarily change the size of the network. For example,
hierarchical structure or centralized structure is more efficient in conveying
information from one edge of a person to the other edge; the length of pass and/or
diameter of the network can be different when the number of relationships an
individual have is different. Investigation of difference in network structure between
different management systems is left for future research.
Formal economic institutions are important; not only they determine economic
performance of those who are under them but also they affect social aspects of
communities, trust, cooperation, other-regarding preferences, norms, and networks.
This paper provides empirical evidence for this claim. Social impact of economic
institutions can be particularly important in common-pool resource management
because resource users in a community are often forced to rely on informal contracting
and good governance can greatly depend on social capital (Bowles & Gintis, 2002).
For stakeholders and policy makers in common-pool resource management these
results can help to understand the effect of management systems currently in place and
possibly help to design a policy that incorporates the social effects of management
systems.
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of Participants
N

Mean

Std.
Dev.
0.50
10.21
0.60

Min

1 if Revenue sharing, 0 otherwise
79
0.58
0
Age
78
53.24
26
Education (1: Junior high school
78
1.73
1
- 6: Graduate degree)
Household size (persons)
77
2.77
1.72
0
Shellfish fishing experience (years)
73
23.93
13.87
1
Note: Not all participants who participated in the experiment completed all the
questions in the survey.

Max
1
79
4
6
55

Table 3.2. Participants and FCA Size
FCA
Shiraoi
Akkeshi
Kushiro
Bekkai
Hamanaka
Wanchu
Ochiishi
Tobu
Hiroo
Konbumori

Participants
9
11
1
8
16
7
8
3
9
6

FCA Members
75
73
6
47
90
32
24
5
10
6
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Percent (%)
12
15
17
17
18
22
33
60
90
100

Table 3.3. Estimating Cooperation Parameters
Dependent variable: Amount contributed by i in session j at round t
𝛽0: Constant

1,272.57***
(0.00)
𝛽1: Total group contribution excluding oneself in
0.08**
the previous round
(0.01)
45,915.791
Variance of 𝑢𝑗1 (Random intercept for sessions)
(0.58)
2
996,737.9**
Variance of 𝑢𝑖𝑖 (Random intercept for individuals)
(0.05)
3
0.007
Variance of 𝑢𝑖𝑖
(Random slope for individual 𝛽1)
(0.63)
Observations
666
Log-likelihood
-4,222.41
Notes: P-value in parentheses. Multilevel Tobit Regression.

Table 3.4. Summary Statistics of Cooperation Parameters
N

Mean

Std.
Min
Max
Dev.
Conditional cooperation
78
0.00
0.02
-0.05
0.08
Unconditional cooperation
78
0
844
-1,500
2,495
Note: Eighty subjects participated, two of whom were dropped from the analysis.

Table 3.5. Summary Statistics of Information Network Indices
N

Mean

Std.
Dev.
15.03
34.50
1.27
1.93

Min

Max

Network size (persons)
78
10.58
0
90
Network density (%)
78
31.08
0
100
Varieties of info (1-6 types)
60
2.05
1
5
Frequency (1: Everyday 63
2.71
1
7
7: Once in season)
Notes: Not all subjects completed all the questions in the survey. The last two rows
have a particularly lower response rate because these questions are part of the
section that requires personal information.
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Table 3.6. Estimated Effects of Revenue Sharing on Social Capital
Dependent variable:
(1)
Un(2)
conditional Conditional
1 if revenue sharing, 0
otherwise

Control
Observations
F statistics
Root MSE

1 if revenue sharing, 0
otherwise

195.87
(0.36)

-0.01**
(0.04)
[0.02]

Yes
Yes
71
71
1.636
9.824***
812.3
0.0234
Dependent variable:
(3)
(4)
Network
Network
density
size
0.11
(0.36)

203.98
(0.19)

(5)
Varieties of
info shared

(6)
Frequency

0.60*
(0.07)
[0.06]

2.02***
(0.00)
[0.00]

Control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
71
71
55
57
F statistics
2.162
5.184**
19.43***
6.650***
Root MSE
0.333
747.1
1.276
1.696
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Clustered s.e. p-value in parentheses and bootstrapped p-value in square
brackets. BRL yields consistent results.
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Figure 3.1. Setup of the Experiment

Figure 3.2. Contents of Information Shared
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Figure 3.3. Resource Stock Density over Time
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I investigated how co-management in a fishery can contribute
to better management of the resource. The first manuscript examined how efficient
management systems to govern common pool resources can evolve endogenously and
demonstrated the importance of involving resource users in the governance process,
which can ease a political hindrance of the transition of management systems. I
examined this in a context of the Rhode Island Fluke Sector Pilot Program using a
laboratory experiment. Through successive fishing seasons, the frequency of subjects'
choosing the individual quota sector rises from half to over 80 percent of subjects.
This suggests that the efficiencies associated with strong individual fishing rights may
emerge endogenously from the sectorization process, even without imposing them
through regulation. Interestingly, a taste for competition prohibits a complete
transition into the individual quota sector.
The second manuscript rigorously measured the direct effects of revenue sharing
and social capital in a community-managed fishery in Japan and identified the indirect
effects resulting from the interaction between revenue sharing and social capital. An
important intermediary between the two factors, revenue sharing arrangement and
social capital, and the management outcomes is collective efforts defined as any
efforts performed as a group to increase harvesting performance of a fishery. Revenue
sharing arrangement and social capital are hypothesized to enhance the effect of the
collective efforts, which leads to efficient and sustainable use of resources in the long
run. Contribution to the group efforts aligns with self-interest when a group of
harvesters shares revenue and harvesters are devoted to collective value due to social
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capital in a community. Using the data collected from 79 skippers belonging to ten
Japanese fishery groups and wild cluster bootstrap for small sample inference, I find
indirect effect of both revenue sharing and social capital interacting to affect the
fishery. Revenue sharing arrangement fosters information network in terms of
varieties of information shared, which improves the economic outcome perceived by
fishers. However, I find no robust evidence of the direct effect of revenue sharing
improving an outcome in a fishery. In addition, I find evidence of the long-run
positive effect of trust in a community on an economic outcome. The results also show
that the fisheries with fishers having similar information network size achieve better
stock conditions over time. These results highlight import roles of social capital in
improving management outcomes.
The third manuscript provided the quantitative effect of management systems—
whether the group has employed revenue sharing or not—on social capital to present
insights into an effective policy that can be employed for development of social
capital. In particular, this manuscript asks whether a difference in management
systems can result in different cooperative relationships and different information
networks in a community. Utilizing the same dataset of 79 skippers from ten fishery
groups in Japan, I find evidence of the positive effect of revenue sharing on
information network possibly because revenue sharing arrangement provides
disincentives to compete and accompanies synchronized collective fishing operation.
Interestingly, revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate unconditionally
(i.e., unilaterally) and furthermore they are less likely to cooperate conditionally (i.e.,
only if others cooperate).
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The results form the second and third manuscripts emphasize an important role of
revenue sharing arrangement in augmenting social capital, particularly information
network, which directly improves management outcomes. In other words, although
revenue sharing arrangement may not directly improve management outcomes, it can
indirectly do so through fostering social capital that has a direct link with the
outcomes. Revenue sharing arrangement can be a management tool to improve a
fishery, but it can be effective only when it augments social capital among fishers. As
a policy intervention, revenue sharing arrangement should be implemented in such a
way that it does not decay, rather foster social capital. In the Japanese surf clam
fishery examined in the manuscripts all the fishery groups engage in the collective
effort for the stock enhancement, which can be best motivated under revenue sharing
arrangement. In addition, they collectively operate fishing on a day-to-day base, which
can bring intense interactions and enable mutual monitoring among the fishers.
Co-management can help our fisheries achieve better management outcomes. It
can facilitate a transition to more efficient management systems to govern resources
by involving resource users in the process. Revenue sharing arrangement in a
community-managed fishery can encourage social capital, which leads to better
outcomes in the fishery. These findings, although specifically embedded in the context
of the Rhode Island groundfish fishery and the Japanese surf clam fishery, provide
important policy implications to other coastal fisheries with similar traits and more
broadly other community-governed natural resource management.
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APPENDIX A. Experimental Instrument

The instructions for the experiment of Manuscript 1.
Fishing Game
In this game, we will play 20 rounds (seasons) of a fishing game. At the end of the
today’s experiment, two of these games will be chosen at random for payment. We do
this so that every round or season is independent of the past performance and
important to you. Your experimental dollars in those two games will be converted to
real dollars.
The Fishery
In today's experiment, you are the owner of a fishing operation that harvests Fish,
along with all the other subjects in your group. The fishery in which you will
participate is managed for sustainability by a management authority. The authority
sets a Total Allowable Catch quota for each season so that the fish stock remains
healthy. The total catch of all participants will not be allowed to exceed this Total
Allowable Catch quota. The total quota is 36,000 pounds, and 3,000 pounds
(=36,000/12) are associated with each subject.
How You Make Money
Your task today is to choose how many days to go fishing in each week of the 52week fishing season. Each day you go fishing, you will land 30 pounds of fish. And
each day you go fishing, it costs you 500 experimental dollars per day.
The price you receive for your fish depends on the total pounds of fish landed by all
subjects, regardless of which group they are in. Price falls as more fish are landed in
each week, according to the table below.
Total
Landings per
Week
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800
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Price
per
Pound
$50.00
$45.20
$40.40
$35.60
$30.80
$26.00
$21.20
$16.40

This fishery is managed under two different systems: Individual Limit Fishing and
Group Limit Fishing.
Individual Limit Fishing
Under Individual Limit Fishing, you will be able to harvest up to 3,000 pounds during
the season. At 30 pounds a day, this means you can fish up to 100 days. You may fish
at any time regardless of how much fish others in your group or in the other group
have harvested, but when you reach your quota, you must stop fishing. You do not
need to harvest all of your quota. You will not be charged for leaving your quota
unused.
Group Limit Fishing
Under Group Limit Fishing, your 3,000 pounds will be added to the total quota of the
Group Limit group. For example, if 6 persons are in the group, at 30 pounds a day a
person, this means that the group can fish up to 600 days. Each subject in this group
may catch as many fish as he or she wants, but once the total quota of the group is
harvested by the members, all members of the Group Limit group must stop fishing.
The group does not need to catch all of the quota. There is no charge associated with
leaving quota unused.
Fishing Software
Attached is an example screen for an Individual Limit Fishing group. The software
proceeds through the 52 weeks of each season at a rate of one every 4 seconds.
You choose the number of days you wish to fish by clicking the round dot below the
number in the lower left corner of the screen. Your fishing decision automatically
carries over from one week to the next, until you change it or the quota is exhausted.
The software will switch you to zero days when the quota limit is reached. In the
week the quota runs out, you land your share of the available quota, but are charged
for all days chosen, so it is a good idea to reduce your days in that week.
Your Profit
Next to your choice of days is information on the total number of days fished in the
fishing group; your landings, price and costs for the current week; and your
cumulative profit for the season. The price for the previous week is displayed whether
or not you harvested fish, so you can use this information to plan your fishing.
At the top of the screen is a graph that tracks your profit (solid black line), the total
quota remaining in your group (solid blue line), and the total quota remaining in the
other group (dashed red line).
Your Group
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The Your Group box in the center of the screen provides important information on
how much other members of your group are fishing, how much fish was landed by
your group in the last week, and how much quota remains in your group. You can use
this information to plan your fishing.
The Other Group Box
The Other Group box next to the Your Group box allows you to see how members of
the other group are using their quota.
The You Box (only for the Individual Limit Fishing group)
The You box will be added in the center of your screen if you choose the Individual
Limit Fishing. It provides information about your individual quota. It shows you your
quota, your last week's harvest, and the amount of your quota that remains.
Questions
Please think back over these instructions now and make sure the rules are clear to you,
and that you understand how to make money.
We will now have a practice round for the Group Limit Fishing. There is no practice
round for the Individual Limit Fishing. Note that there will be some minor change on
the screen. Since everyone fishes in the same fishing group, there will be no
information related to the Other Group mentioned earlier.
[Practice round]
Prior to each season, you will be asked to choose whether you would like to fish in the
Individual Limit group or the Group Limit group. After all subjects have made their
management choices, you can see how many chose to be in each group by dividing its
total quota by 3,000.
You will choose your desired fishing group from a drop-down menu that appears at
the beginning of each season. You may switch fishing groups between seasons, but
you have to stay in the same group throughout the season.
Questions?
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The instructions for the experiment of Manuscripts 2 and 3. Original instructions are
in Japanese.
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in the experiment today. During the
experiment, you will earn money. How much more money you could make depends
on your choices and the choices of others during the experiment. If you follow the
instructions and make careful decisions, you could earn more money. Thus, it is
imporatnt to understand the instructions very well. After the experiment, you will be
asked to fill out a confidential survey. You will be paid in cash as you leave.
Before beginning, please find your ID number. This ID number will be used to keep
any decisions made at the experiment and the survey confidential.
Please refrain from talking to each other or talking on the cell phone during the
experiment and the survey.
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to ask any of us.
First, please find the following items in front of you.
• Instructions (this paper)
• Pen
• Scratch paper
• Record sheet
• Calculater
• Three boxes (red, green, yellow each)
Please find your ID number on the sides of the red and green boxes. If you see
a different number, please raise your hand.
• Please find five 500 yen coins and five 100 yen coins inside the yellow box. If
you see more or less, please raise your hand.
The amount you will earn in the experiment depends on the decisions you and
everyone else make during the experiment.
In the experiment, you will be asked to repeat a task ten times.
You are a member of a group of four people. Prior to every round, you will be given
an allowance of 3,000 yen. You will be asked to decide how much of the allowance to
keep to yourself and how much of the allowance to allocate to a group. Before the
experiment, we will notify you privately which group you belong to, but you will not
know who belongs to which group.
In the case where the number of participants is not divisible by four, some of you
simultaneously belong to two groups, and their decisions are counted in two groups.
But only one decision counted in one of the groups is valid for payoff calculation. The
decision counted in the other group is only used to make up for lacking members and
is irrelevant for their own payoffs. You will not know whether you belong to two
groups or whether there are those who belong to two groups in your group. You will
only know the results relevant to your actual payoffs.
In the experiment you will be asked to repeat this allocation decision ten times. After
the sixth round, we will make some change to the rule. You will play with the same
members throughout the experiment.
180

Steps to complete the allocation decision;
• You are notified privately which group you belong to, either A, B, or C. All of
you stay in the same group until the end.
• At the beginning of each round, you are given an empty red box, an empty
green box, and a yellow box with five 500 yen coins and five 100 yen coins.
Consider this 3,000 yen (five 500 yen conts and five 100 yen coins) as your
allowance.
• You are asked to allocate this 3,000 yen either to yourself or to your group.
You may allocate any amount from 0 to 3,000 in an increment of 100 yen.
• Please decide privately how much of 3,000 yen to keep to yourself and how
much to allocate to your group. Please do not discuss with your neighbors. We
will never tell anyone your decisions, and no one will know how much others
have allocated to themselves or to their group.
• Please put the money to keep to yourself in a red box and the money to
allocate to your group in a green box. Please transfer all 3,000 yen either
to a red box or to a green box.
• Please write down the amount you have kept to yourself and the amount you
have allocated to your group on a record sheet.
• We collect all the boxes and record everyone’s decision.
• We distribute a result slip that includes the total amount allocated to your
group and dividends from your group earnings. The total amount allocated to
your group will be multiplied by two and distributed equally to every member
of the group. However, no one will know who have distributed how much to
the group.
• Finally, please calculate your total payoffs for this round by adding the amount
you have kept to yourself and the dividends from your group, and write it
down on a record sheet.
• This completes one round.
Important
How to calculate your total payoffs
1. The amount you keep to yourself is your own earnings.
2. The total amount allocated to the group by your group members is
multiplied by two. Consider this as your group’s total earnings. The
group’s total earnings are distributed equally to every member of the
group.
Regardless of how much you have allocated to the group, you receive the same
amount of the dividends as the others in your group. Those who have not
allocated any money to the group also receive the same amount of the dividends
as the others in the group. The sum of the above 1 and 2 is your total individual
payoffs for a round.
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The following examples will help you understand how this experiment works.
Example 1: When every member allocates all of the allowance to the group
Group account
Total amount allocated = 12,000 yen
Total group earnings (12,000 X 2) = 24,000
yen
3,000 yen

3,000 yen

3,000 yen

3,000 yen

Equal dividends (1/4
each)
= 6,000 yen per person

To allocate to the group

Mr. Satoh

Mr. Suzuki

Mr. Takahashi

Mr. Tanaka

To keep to themselves

0 yen

0 yen

0 yen

0 yen

Individual payoffs

Mr. Satoh

Mr. Suzuki

Mr. Takahashi

6,000 yen

6,000 yen

6,000 yen

Mr. Tanaka
6,000 yen

In this case, everyone’s individual payoffs are the dividends from the group earnings (6,000 yen).

Why? The total amount allocated to the group is 3,000 + 3,000 + 3,000 + 3,000 =
12,000. The total amount allocated by all the members in the group is 12,000 yen. This
12,000 yen is multiplied by two and then divided by four to be shared equally among
all the members. Thus, every member of the group receives 6,000 yen as individual
payoffs.
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Example 2: When every member keeps all of the allowance to themselves
Group account
Total amount allocated = 0 yen
Total group earnings (0 X 2) = 0 yen

0 yen

0 yen

0 yen

0 yen

To allocate to the group

Mr. Satoh Mr. Suzuki

Mr. Takahashi

Equal dividends (1/4
each)
= 0 yen per person
Mr. Tanaka

To keep to themselves
3,000 yen

3,000 yen

3,000 yen

3,000 yen

Individual payoffs

Mr. Satoh Mr. Suzuki
3,000 yen

3,000 yen

Mr. Takahashi
3,000 yen

Mr. Tanaka
3,000 yen

In this case, everyone’s individual payoffs are the amount kept to themselves (3,000 yen).

Why? The total amount allocated to the group is 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0. The group earnings
are zero, and everyone receives 3,000 yen, the amount kept to themselves, as
individual payoffs.
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Example 3: Three members allocate all of their allowance to the group
and the other one member keeps all of his allowance to himself.
Group account
Total amount allocated = 9,000 yen
Total group earnings (9,000 X 2) = 18,000
yen
3,000 yen

3,000 yen

3,000 yen

0

To allocate to the group

Mr. Satoh

Equal dividends (1/4
each)
= 4,500 yen per person

Mr. Suzuki Mr. Takahashi Mr. Tanaka
To keep to themselves

0

0

0

3,000 yen

Individual payoffs

Mr. Satoh
4,500 yen

Mr. Suzuki Mr. Takahashi
4,500 yen

4,500 yen

Mr. Tanaka

7,500 yen

In this case, Mr. Satoh’s, Mr. Suzuki’s, and Mr. Takahashi’s individual payoffs are the
dividends from the group earnings only (4,500 yen) while Mr. Tanaka’s individual payoffs
are the sum of the dividends and the money kept to himself (7,500 yen).

Why? One of the four members allocated nothing to the group, and the other three
allocated 3,000 yen each to the group. The total amount allocated to the group is 0 +
3,000 + 3,000 + 3,000 = 9,000. This 9,000 yen is multiplied by two and then shared
equally among all the members. Whether one has allocated to the group or not,
everyone receives 4,500 yen from the group earnings. Thus, those who allocated 3,000
yen to the group receives 4,500 yen as individual payoffs, but those who allocated
nothing to the group receive 3,000 yen, the amount kept to themselves, plus the
dividends of 4,500 yen as individual payoffs.
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Are there any questions up to this point?
At the end of the experiment, two of the ten rounds will be chosen at random. The
average amount of these two rounds will be actually paid. This means that all the
rounds have a possibility of deciding how much cash you can earn. It is important you
make a careful decision every round.
We are about to begin the first round. Please think back over the instructions now and
make sure the rules are clear to you. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
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Part 2 (to be handed out after the 5th round)
We have completed five rounds, and we modify the rules for the rest of the rounds.
Same steps as before;
• All of you stay in the same group as before until the end.
• At the beginning of each round, you are given an empty red box, an empty
green box, and a yellow box with five 500 yen coins and five 100 yen coins.
• Please put the moneyto keep to yourself in a red box and the money to allocate
to the group in a green box. You may allocate any amount from 0 to 3,000 in
an increment of 100 yen. Please transfer all 3,000 yen either to a red box or to
a green box.
• Please decide privately how much to keep to yourself and how much to
allocate to your group.
• Please write down the amount you have kept to yourself and the amount you
have allocated to your group on a record sheet.
• We collect all the boxes and record everyone’s decision.
• We distribute a result slip that includes the total amount allocated to your
group and the dividends from your group earnings. The total amount allocated
to your group will be multiplied by two and distributed equally to every
member of the group. However, no one will know who have distributed how
much to the group.
• Please write down the dividends from your group earnings on the record sheet.
The following steps apply for the following rounds;
Dissatisfied face
• You are asked to fill out an order form for “dissatisfied
face.” If you feel dissatisfied with the group allocation
from other members in your group, you can send
“dissatisfied face” as shown in the box. Whether you
want to send “dissatisfied face” or not, please fill out
the form by circling the corresponding statement. It
costs 60 yen to order “dissatisfied face.”
• If you didn’t order “dissatisfied face,” your final
payoffs are the sum of the amount kept to yourself and
the dividends from your group earnings. If you ordered “dissatisfied face,”
your final payoffs are the sum of the amount kept to yourself and the dividends
from your group earnings minus 60 yen, the cost of sending “dissatisfied face.”
Please write it down on the record sheet.
• We collect the order forms.
• As many “dissatisfied face” slips as ordered by the members in your group are
put in a yellow box with coins and returned to you with a red and a green
boxes. Note that you also receive “dissatisfied face” you yourself ordered. You
will not know who have sent “dissatisfied face.”
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Are there any questions before we resume?
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APPENDIX B. Survey Instrument

The survey used for Manuscripts 2 and 3. Originals are in Japanese.
This survey asks about your opinions and how you engage in shellfish fishery. It will
provide important information as the results in the experiment. We appreciate your
cooperation. The ID number will keep your answers in this survey confidential. We
will not identify individuals from the answers in this survey.

Please write down your ID number in the space provided.

Q1. This question asks about your opinions. Please indicate how strongly you agree or
disagree with the following statements on a five-point scale. Check only one box for
each statement.
Strongly
Disagree
a. These days you
can't count on
strangers
b. In dealing with
strangers one is
better off to be
cautious until they
have provided
evidence that they
are trustworthy.

Disagree

Neither
Disagree
nor Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Q2. The following questions ask you about how you share private, sensitive
information that influenced your profits from shellfish fishing and/or its catch with
other shellfish fishermen.
a.

During the 2012 season, how many shellfish fishermen did you
share such information with?

b. How many of the fishermen that you shared such information
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persons

with during the 2012 season are also family members?
c.

persons

We would like to ask you for the names of 5 fishermen that you shared most such information
with during the 2012 season. Please raise your hand at this point. We will bring a separate
sheet for listing their names.
We will convert the names you provide to ID numbers, whether or not the person is
participating in the research today. Please provide their full names. After we convert the names
into the numbers, we will destroy all the sheets in front of you. They will not be used to refer
to the answers in this survey.

d. Please indicate the number of years you have known each of the fishermen you identified in the
above question c.

Number of years
Fisherman 1
Fisherman 2
Fisherman 3
Fisherman 4
Fisherman 5
e. What do you have in common with each of these fishermen? Check all that apply.

Family
members1

Close
friends 2

Boat and
gear3

Age group 4

Neighborho
od5

Fisherman 1
Fisherman 2
Fisherman 3
Fisherman 4
Fisherman 5
f. On average, how often did you share private, sensitive information that influenced your profits
and/or catch with each of these fishermen during the 2012 season? Check only one box for each
fisherman.
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Every
day
Fisher
man 1

Every
few days

Once per
week

Once
every
two
weeks

Every
two
months

Once per
month

Once
during
the
season

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fisher
man 2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fisher
man 3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fisher
man 4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Fisher
man 5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

g. When sharing such information with these fishermen during the 2012 season, what kind of
information did you share? Check all that apply.

Market1

Buyer
informatio
n2

Specific
hot-spots3

Market for
bycatch
and its
hot-spots4

High gear
density
areas5

Boat and
gear6

Fisherman 1
Fisherman 2
Fisherman 3
Fisherman 4
Fisherman 5
h. How influential was the information you received from these fishermen to your profits and/or
catch? Check only one box for each fisherman.

Not
influential
at all 1
Fisherman 1

1

Not influential
2

3
2

4
3

5
4
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Very
influential
8

Influential
6
5

7
6

7

8

Fisherman 2
Fisherman 3
Fisherman 4
Fisherman 5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Q3. The following questions ask you about how you share general, public information
that did NOT influence your profits from shellfish fishing and/or its catch with other
fishermen.
a. During the 2012 season, how many shellfish fishermen did you
share such information with?

persons

b. When sharing such information with these fishermen during the 2012 season, what kind of
information did you share? Check all that apply.

Check all that apply

Contents of information
Market1
Buyer information2
Specific hot-spots3
Market for bycatch and its hot-spots4
Boat and gear5
Other6（Please specify below）

c. How often did you share such information with other fishermen during the 2012 season? Check
only one box.
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Frequency

Check only one box

Every day

1

Every few days

2

Once every two weeks

3

Once per month

4

Every two months

5

Once during the season

6

Q4. This question asks about your opinions. Please indicate how strongly you agree or
disagree with the following statements on a five-point scale. Check only one box for
each statement.

Strongly
Disagree
a. Shellfish resources you are
fishing are currently
abundant.
b. Resource management in
your FCA is successful in
increasing shellfish
resources or maintaining
certain level.
c. Fishery management in
your FCA is successful in
increasing fishermen’s
profits from fishing or
maintaining certain level.

Disagree

Neither
Disagree
nor
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Q5. This question asks about how you engage in FCA implementing new rules in
shellfish fishing operations.
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a. Has your FCA implemented, modified, or discontinued the following operational rules while
you are a member?
• Pooling system
• Collective use of fishing boats and/or gears
• Collective branding and/or marketing of catch
• Cooperative fishing (multiple owners jointly operate in one of their boats)
• Collective landing of catch
• Rotation of fishing grounds

Check only one box
Yes

1

→

to Q b.

No

2

→

to Q c.

Don’t know

3

→

to Q c.

b. Please answer this question if you chose “Yes” to the above question a. What role did you play
when FCA was implementing, modifying, or discontinuing the rules? Check all that apply.

Role you played when FCA implemented, modified, or
discontinued the rules

Check all that apply

Have proposed the new rule 1
Have convinced other fishermen for the proposed rule 2
Have stated own opinion on the proposed rule 3
Have voted for/against the proposed rule 4
Other 5（Please specify below）

c. Are you currently serving or have you served as an executive member of the shellfish group?

Executive member

Check only one box
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Yes

1

→

to Q d.

No

2

→

to Q6

Don't’ know

3

→

to Q6

d. How many years have you been serving or have served as an
executive member?

years

Q6 This question asks about interaction with other shellfish fishermen outside of
fishery.
a. Are there any shellfish fishermen in your neighborhood?

Shellfish fishermen in
neighbourhood?

Check only
one box

Yes

1

No

2

Don’t know (Please
explain why.)

→How may
fishermen?

persons

3

b. Do you meet other fishermen other than at the port? For example, at party, family gathering, etc.

Interactions outside of the port

Check only one box

Yes

1

→

to Q c.

No

2

→

to Q7

3

→

to Q7

Don’t know (Please explain
why.)

194

c. On average how often do you meet other fishermen other than at the port? Check only one box.

Frequency of meeting outside of the port

Check only one box

More than once a week

1

Few times a month

2

Once every few months

3

Less than every half year

4

d. What are those occasions? Please specify below.

Q7 This question asks about experience on shellfish resources.
a. Have you seen the shellfish resources depleted or drastically decreased? Check only one box.

Shellfish resources

Check only one box

Seen them depleted

1

→

to Q b.

Seen them drastically decreased

2

→

to Q b.

Never seen

3

→

to Q8

Don’t know

4

→

to Q8

b. How many years ago did you see them depleted or drastically decreased? Check all that apply.

How many years ago?

Check all that apply

Recently (now to 5 years ago) 1
6 years ago to 10 years ago 2
11 years ago to 15 years ago 3
16 years ago to 20 years ago 4
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More than 21 years ago 5
c. How did you respond as an individual to such depletion or decrease in resources?

d. How did your shellfish group respond to such depletion or decrease in resources?

Q8 This question asks about you.
a. What is your age?

years
b. What is your gender?

1

Male

0

Female

c. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?。

1
2
3

Junior high school

4

Senior high school

5

Technical school or some college

6

d. How many people are there in your household, not including
yourself?

2 year college degree
4 year college degree
Graduate degree

persons

e. How many of these people are 18 years old or younger?

persons
f. How long have you been fishing shellfish? Please provide the
number of years of experience including this year?
g. Please provide the tonnage of your boat for shellfish fishing?
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years

tons
h. Did you fish shellfish in other areas before?

Yes

1

→

to Q i.

No

0

→

to Q j.

i. From what year to what year, did you fish shellfish in other areas? Please provide a specific
year.

Taisho era・Showa era・Heisei era ・
Western calendar

year

to year

(Please circle one)
j. Including yourself, how many generations has your family
participated in commercial fishing?

generations

k. Do you engage in other occupation (including fishing other species)?

Yes

1

→

to Q l.

No

0

→

to Q9

l. If you engage in fishing other species, please provide the names of the species. If you engage in
other occupation, please provide the occupation.

Fish other
species

List the names.

Other
occupation

List the occupation.

Other species
and other
occupation

List both the names of other species and occupation.

_____________________________________________________________________
This is the end of the survey. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
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